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THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY 
Unemployment  Expectations, 
Jumping  (S,s)  Triggers,  and 
Household  Balance  Sheets 
1. Introduction 
The U.S.  recession  that began  in 1990 and the feeble  recovery  that fol- 
lowed  differed  from the pattern of previous  postwar  business  cycles in 
several  respects,  most  notably  in the  sustained  weakness  in consump- 
tion spending,  particularly for durable goods.  Blanchard (1993) estimates 
a simple  macroeconomic  model  and finds that the recession  was largely 
the result of a "consumption  shock." Hall (1993) finds an important role 
for  a  "spontaneous  decline  in  consumption,"  especially  for  durable 
goods.  Furthermore,  structural macroeconomic  models  like the FRB-US 
model  substantially  overpredicted  consumption  spending  throughout 
the 1990 recession  and especially  the early recovery period. 
In  December  1991,  as  the  economy  struggled  to  make  its  way  out 
of recession,  Federal Reserve  Chairman Alan  Greenspan  included  the 
following  statements  in  Congressional  testimony  on  the  state  of  the 
economy: 
During the 1980s, large stocks  of physical  assets were  amassed  in a large  number 
of sectors, largely  financed by huge increases  in indebtedness.  ...  In the house- 
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hold sector, purchases of motor vehicles and other consumer durables  ran for 
several years at remarkably  high levels and were often paid  for with installment 
or other  debt that carried  extended  maturities.  In some  parts  of the United States, 
the household  spending boom reached  to the purchase  of homes. ...  The after- 
math of all this activity is a considerable  degree  of financial stress in the house- 
hold sector. (Greenspan,  1992) 
In this testimony  and elsewhere,  Greenspan  consistently  blamed  the 
1990-1991  recession  and the subsequent  painfully  slow  recovery on the 
"deteriorated  balance  sheets"  of  both  firms  and  households  resulting 
from the buildup  of debt in the 1980s. Figure 1 shows  that the runup in 
household  debt in the 1980s was indeed  impressive.  Most of this growth 
was in mortgage  debt,  spurred by the financial deregulation  of the early 
1980s which led to low down-payment  requirements on home purchases. 
The problematic  part of what  we  will  call the  Greenspan  hypothesis  is 
that  it  provides  no  explanation  for  why  balance-sheet  positions  that 
consumers  voluntarily  chose  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1990 were 
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suddenly a major  contractionary  force  in the fall of 1990  and in 1991.  One 
plausible possibility is that an aggregate "target"  consumer balance- 
sheet  position  depends,  among  other  things,  on  the  degree  of  consum- 
ers'  uncertainty  about  the  future,  and  in  particular  on  their  perceptions 
about  the  risk  of  future  unemployment  spells.  Figure  2  plots  the  best 
available  data  on  household  unemployment  expectations,  from  the  Uni- 
versity  of  Michigan's  monthly  surveys  of  consumers.1  Unemployment 
expectations  deteriorated  sharply  in  the  fall  of  1990,  right  at the  time  of 
the  "spontaneous"  consumption  drop.2  The  natural  interpretation  is that 
1. The index is equal to the fraction  of consumers  surveyed  who thought unemployment 
would rise over the next twelve months minus the fraction  who thought  unemployment 
would fall. 
2. We choose this unemployment  expectations  index to measure  consumer  sentiment  for 
several reasons. First, it has a much clearer  definition  than the more commonly  used 
overall measures of sentiment, which combine  in arbitrary  ways the answers to ques- 
tions about the past, present, and future conditions in a variety of largely unrelated 
markets. Second, one of the principal  theoretical  results in the precautionary-saving 
literature  is that large shocks like unemployment  spells should be disproportionately 168 *  CARROLL  & DUNN 
it was  the deterioration  in unemployment  expectations  that converted  a 
balance-sheet  position  which  consumers  had voluntarily chosen  in hap- 
pier times  into  one  that required serious  "repair." Indeed,  it might  ap- 
pear tempting  to attribute the consumption  drop in 1990 entirely to the 
deterioration  in  sentiment  and  to  dismiss  the  condition  of  household 
balance sheets  as a sideshow.3 One difficulty of this interpretation,  how- 
ever,  is  that  unemployment  expectations  always  deteriorate  near  the 
beginning  of a recession  (see  Figure 2 again),  and  the  1990 experience 
was  not  sufficiently  different  from previous  recessions  to explain  why 
consumption  growth  was  weaker  than  it usually  is during  recessions. 
The behavior  of  the  unemployment  expectations  index  was  more  un- 
usual  after the trough of the recession;  usually  the index plummets  just 
after the  trough,  but unemployment  expectations  remained  quite high 
for a long  time  after the  1991 trough.4 Still, even  consumption  models 
which  incorporate  the  unemployment  expectations  index  have  large 
negative  residuals  during and after the 1990 recession,  implying  that the 
consumption  weakness  cannot  be  explained  as  simply  reflecting  con- 
sumer pessimism. 
Prompted  by this debate,  this paper is a broad attempt to make sense 
of the  relationship  between  household  balance  sheets,  unemployment 
expectations,  and household  purchases.  We begin (in Section 2) by docu- 
menting  what  we  take to be the main stylized  facts about the empirical 
relationships  between  consumer  purchases,  household  balance sheets, 
and uncertainty. The only systematic  relationship we are able to uncover 
between  balance-sheet  measures and spending  is a robust positive  correla- 
tion between  lagged  debt growth  and the current level  of spending  on 
durables,  a relationship  which  is  most  easily  interpreted  as reflecting 
simultaneity  rather than a causal link. However,  we do identify  another 
empirical  regularity:  our  preferred  measure  of uncertainty,  the  lagged 
value  of  the  unemployment  expectations  index  plotted  in  Figure 2,  is 
robustly  correlated  with  every  measure  of  consumer  spending,  even 
after controlling  for permanent  income  as best we  can (and in particular 
after controlling  for whatever  information  unemployment  expectations 
contain about future income). 
important  in determining  behavior  as compared  with small shocks such as wage fluc- 
tuations for employed consumers. Finally,  the unemployment expectations  index is 
considerably  more robustly  correlated  with most measures  of spending than are overall 
sentiment  measures. 
3. Both Blanchard  (1993)  and Hall (1993)  suggest that the decline in sentiment  was impor- 
tant, but neither emphasizes  balance-sheet  issues. 
4. It is interesting  to note that the index was right,  in the sense that  the unemployment  rate 
did remain  unusually  high for an unusually  long period  after  the trough. Unemployment  Expectations,  Jumping  Triggers,  Household  Balance  Sheets  *  169 
With these  results in mind,  we then (in Section 3) construct a theoreti- 
cal model  of  the  durable-goods  purchase  problem  for consumers  who 
face the possibility  of unemployment  spells.  Because analytical solutions 
are not  available when  there is labor-income  uncertainty, we  solve  the 
model  numerically.  We find that the model  implies  that a rise in uncer- 
tainty  causes  consumers  to  delay  durables  purchases  [formally,  the 
lower  trigger  of  the  (S,s) rule jumps  down;  hence  our title].  We then 
compare simulation  results from the model  with our empirical evidence 
for the U.S.  economy,  and find that the model explains  some but not all 
of  the  empirical  findings.  In  particular,  the  model  implies  a  much 
stronger role for changes  in unemployment  expectations,  and a weaker 
role for the lagged  level  of unemployment  expectations,  than we find in 
the  data.  Finally, in  Section  6,  we  show  that the  model  implies  that a 
financial  liberalization  which  loosens  liquidity  constraints  will  cause  a 
runup  in aggregate  debt like the runup  shown  in Figure 1, and that in 
the  liberalized  economy  the  reaction  of  durables  purchases  to  uncer- 
tainty is intensified.  Thus our model potentially rationalizes the idea that 
the runup  of consumer  debt in the 1980s was  partly responsible  for the 
puzzling  weakness  of consumption  spending  during and after the 1990 
recession.  Furthermore, the model implies that the continuing  growth of 
the  debt  ratio may  be  making  consumption  increasingly  vulnerable  to 
swings  in consumer  sentiment. 
2.  Empirical  Results 
2.1  BALANCE SHEETS AND  NONDURABLES 
CONSUMPTION  GROWTH 
Although  housing  and other durable goods account for most of the volatil- 
ity of consumption  spending  over the business  cycle, we begin our em- 
pirical work by examining  spending  on nondurable  goods.  Partly this is 
because  virtually no existing  work has examined  the effect of either bal- 
ance sheets  or time-varying unemployment  expectations on nondurables 
spending,  and these are important questions in their own right. Partly,  we 
examine  nondurables  because  one  of the innovations  of our theoretical 
model is our joint treatment of durables and nondurable goods.5 Thus, in 
principle,  even  in the absence  of time-varying  unemployment  risk our 
theoretical  model  might  generate  different predictions  for nondurables 
spending  than standard models. 
The benchmark model with which we intend to compare both empirical 
5. Most previous modeling efforts, with the exception  of Bemanke  (1985),  have assumed 
utility flows either solely from nondurables  or solely from  durables,  or at the very least 
that utility  from durables  and nondurables  is separable. 170 *  CARROLL  & DUNN 
results and the theoretical predictions of our model is the representative- 
agent,  certainty-equivalent  version  of  the  permanent-income  model 
(henceforth,  CEQ PIH model),  as used,  for example, by Campbell (1987), 
Campbell and Deaton  (1989), and many others. In this model,  consump- 
tion  is equal  to permanent income, defined  as the annuity  value  of total 
wealth,  human  and nonhuman: 
r 
Ct  =  (Wh  +  Wt),  l+r  1 +  r 
00/  1  s-t 
Wt -  T  )  Y 
where  Ys is total noncapital  income  (labor income  plus  net transfers) in 
period s. We define a variable which we will call annuity labor  income  At as 
the annuity  value  of human  wealth6: 
r 
At_  -  Wh. 
1 +  r  t  l+r 
As  Hall (1978) famously  pointed  out,  one  of the  implications  of this 
model  is that lagged  information  should  have  no  predictive  power  for 
current consumption  growth.  Campbell and Mankiw (1989) showed  that 
all of the failures of the aggregate CEQ PIH model could be explained by 
a model  in which  a fraction A of aggregate labor income  goes  to rule-of- 
thumb consumers  who  simply spend all available income in each quarter 
while  1 -  A of income accrues to consumers  who behave according to the 
CEQ PIH model.  These assumptions,  plus a few approximations,  lead to 
an estimating  equation  of the form 
A log Ct =  y0 +  y1Et-1  A log Yt +  Et, 
where  the expectation  is taken with respect to a set of instruments  dated 
t -  1.7 Because,  strictly speaking,  the model applies only to the consump- 
6. We adopt this terminology  partly to avoid confusion  between  the variable in this model 
and the permanent-labor-income  variable in our theoretical model. 
7. Because  time aggregation  can introduce  an MA(1) error term, the usual procedure is to 
use instruments  dated t -  2. However,  as Carroll, Fuhrer, and Wilcox (1994) argue, this 
unnecessarily  discards  potentially  valuable  information  in  variables  dated  t  -  1.  We 
follow  those  authors  in pursuing  a nonlinear  estimation  methodology  that allows  us to 
use  instruments  dated  t -  1 and  to impose  the orthogonality  restriction directly. Our 
instruments  for income  growth  are  the  same  as  those  used  by  Carroll, Fuhrer, and 
Wilcox (1994): three lags each of income growth,  consumption  growth,  the change in the Unemployment  Expectations,  Jumping  Triggers,  Household  Balance  Sheets * 171 
Table 1  THE SENTIMENT-AUGMENTED CAMPBELL-MANKIW MODELa 
Balance-sheet  Balance 
Row  measure  Et_lA log Yt  UEt-1  sheet  0  SSR  D-W 
1  0.509  0.086  0.49  1.98 
(4.13)***  (0.93) 
2  -1.310  0.136  0.58  1.97 
-(3.69)***  (1.47) 
3  0.269  -0.906  0.092  0.50  1.98 
(1.64)  -(2.18)**  (0.99) 
4  A log D,_1  0.246  -0.690  0.095  0.088  0.49  2.00 
(1.50)  -(1.55)  (1.33)  (0.94) 
5  rDt_l/Yt_  0.257  -0.820  -0.073  0.0937  0.49  1.98 
(1.57)  -(1.90)*  -(0.93)  (1.00) 
6  Dt-l/At_l  0.247  -0.906  -0.002  0.096  0.50  1.97 
(1.45)  -(2.15)**  -(0.33)  (1.02) 
"Dependent  variable  is nondurable  consumption  growth,  quarterly  data, 1963:3-1994:3.  *, significant  at 
10%  or  better;  **,  at 5%  or  better;  ***,  at 1%  or  better.  t-Statistics  are  listed  in parentheses  below  coefficient 
estimates. Yt  is total household wage and transfer  income. UEt_1 is the unemployment  expectations 
index. The instruments  are the same as the second set used in Carroll,  Fuhrer,  and Wilcox  (1994).  The 
balance  sheet variables  are  the growth  in total  household  liabilities  (A  log Dt_l), the debt service  burden 
(rDt_i/Yt_i),  and the ratio  of total  household  liabilities  to annuity  income  (Dt_l/At_l).  0 is the estimated 
coefficient  on the moving average  error  term. A constant  term  was also included  but is not reported. 
tion of nondurables,  our measure of consumption  is spending  on nondu- 
rable goods  from the NIPA accounts.8 
Results  are contained  in Table 1. Our first regression  reproduces  the 
basic result of Campbell and Mankiw  (1989): the coefficient  on predict- 
able  income  growth  is  enormously  statistically  significant  (with  a  t- 
statistic greater than 4), and suggests  that rule-of-thumb consumers  earn 
three-month  T-bill  rate, the change in the unemployment  rate, and the growth of the 
S&P  500 index;  and one lag of the log difference  between consumption  and income  and 
of the measure of sentiment  being tested (in our case, unemployment  expectations;  in 
Carroll,  Fuhrer,  and Wilcox's  paper, overall  consumer  sentiment).  The adjusted  R2  on 
the first-stage  regression  for income growth is 0.41. 
8. The model is often estimated on the sum of nondurables  and services consumption. 
However, in the final version of NIPA  data, substantial  parts of services consumption 
are constructed  using quarterly  interpolation  through  annual  estimates,  where the later 
endpoint for the interpolation  is strictly  in the future  of some of the quarterly  estimates  it 
is used to construct.  This potentially  introduces  spurious  time-series  properties  into the 
services component of spending, which are most easily avoided by excluding  services 
from the measure of consumption. For more discussion of these points, see Wilcox 
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roughly  half of aggregate labor income.  Our second  regression performs 
a simple  Hall-style  test  of whether  lagged  unemployment  expectations 
are useful  in predicting  current consumption  growth.  Again the answer 
is overwhelmingly  yes;  the  t-statistic is 3.7.  Our next regression  recon- 
firms the  main  result  of Carroll, Fuhrer, and Wilcox (1994): the lagged 
level  of consumer  sentiment  (as measured  by unemployment  expecta- 
tions)  contains  substantial  predictive  power  for  consumption  growth 
even after controlling for  the information sentiment contains about income 
growth.9,10 
Turning now  to the role of balance-sheet  variables, our goal is to test 
whether  such  variables  add  anything  to  the  benchmark  sentiment- 
augmented  Campbell-Mankiw  model  presented  in row 3 of Table 1. In 
our background  empirical work we examined  a broad set of measures  of 
household  balance-sheet  conditions,  but in this paper we present results 
for only  three measures:  the ratio of liabilities to annuity  labor income, 
the ratio of liabilities to assets,  and the growth  rate of liabilities.l'  None 
of the  other balance-sheet  variables we  examined  performed  better (in 
the sense  of being  more highly  correlated with the dependent  variables 
we are interested  in) than these  three variables.12 
Our empirical test is simply whether lagged balance-sheet variables are 
statistically  significant  when  we  add them  to the sentiment-augmented 
Campbell-Mankiw  model.13 As rows 4 through 6 of the table show, none 
of  the  balance-sheet  variables  is  statistically  significant  in  any  of  the 
9. Carroll,  Fuhrer,  and Wilcox  used the overall  index of consumer  sentiment  rather  than 
the unemployment expectations index we use here; also, they tested for the joint 
significance  of four lags of sentiment, rather  than just a single lag as we do. 
10. When lagged unemployment expectations  are added to the Campbell-Mankiw  equa- 
tion, the coefficient  estimate  on forecastable  income  growth  is about  half of its previous 
value and just misses being statistically  significant  (the  p-value  is 0.103).  The reason  the 
statistical  significance  of the forecastable  part of income growth drops so dramatically 
when lagged unemployment  expectations  are included  in the regression  is that lagged 
unemployment  expectations  are highly correlated  with the forecastable  component  of 
income growth. Whether  income growth  is significant,  lagged  unemployment  expecta- 
tions are significant, or neither is significant  is somewhat sensitive to the choice of 
instruments;  in particular,  if the instrument  set does not contain  variables  that provide 
substantial  information  about income growth that is independent of the information 
about income growth contained in unemployment  expectations,  typically  neither in- 
come growth nor unemployment  expectations  is individually  significant. 
11. See below for a discussion of how we  constructed our estimate of annuity labor 
income. 
12. We also examined the ratio  of debt to net worth, the ratio  of debt to liquid  assets, the 
ratio of debt to current  income, and the ratio of the debt service burden to annuity 
income, among others. 
13. Of course, we also add them to the set of instruments  used for predicting  income 
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regressions.14 Thus,  there is little evidence  that household  balance-sheet 
conditions  have any influence  on nondurables  consumption  growth that 
operates  through  any  channel  outside  of  the  sentiment-augmented 
Campbell-Mankiw  model.15 
We now  turn to the question  of the relative importance  for nondura- 
bles consumption  of innovations  to annuity income and to unemployment 
expectations.  This question  is of central importance to the enterprise  of 
this paper, because  the answer  should  help to inform us whether  ignor- 
ing fluctuations  in uncertainty  is a small omission  (which is well  worth 
the  associated  modeling  dividend  of  analytical  tractability) or a large 
omission,  so that any model  which  ignores  uncertainty is likely to tell a 
seriously  incomplete  story about the determinants  of consumption  over 
the business  cycle. 
To examine  this issue  (and many others we will introduce later in the 
paper) we need  an estimate of the level of annuity income.  We construct 
two  estimates,  first following  a method  used  to estimate  annuity  per- 
sonal  disposable  income  in  the  FRB-US model  at the  Federal Reserve 
Board, then using a method  of our own devising.  The FRB-US  methodol- 
ogy  (AFRB'U)  is based on an assumption  that the ratio of personal income 
to GDP is stationary and that the GDP gap is stationary. A VAR forecast- 
ing  system  is  used  to estimate  the  projected  future  output  gap XGAP 
and the projected  future gap in the ratio of income  to GDP, YGAP. The 
VAR system  includes  equations  for inflation,  the fed funds  rate, XGAP, 
14. The debt-to-annuity-income  variable appears to be nonstationary,  while consump- 
tion growth is approximately  stationary;  econometric  theory implies that for a large 
enough time sample, the coefficient in a regression of a stationary  variable on a 
nonstationary  one must yield a zero coefficient,  so the insignificance  of this variable  is 
hardly  surprising. 
15. These results  are somewhat  at variance  with previous  results  of Ludvigson  (1996),  who 
found that predictable  debt growth was significantly  related  to consumption  growth. 
We were able to reproduce  Ludvigson's  results, and have determined  that there are 
four  reasons  for the differences  in outcomes.  First,  our measure  of consumption  spend- 
ing is restricted  to nondurable  goods, while Ludvigson  followed most of the previous 
literature  by examining  spending on nondurable  goods and services. We believe that 
the data construction  methods for the quarterly  services expenditures  render those 
data  unsuitable  for regressions  of this kind. Second,  because  our focus is on the overall 
structure  of household balance  sheets, our measure  of debt is total household liabili- 
ties, while Ludvigson's  balance-sheet  variable  was consumer  installment  credit, i.e., 
mainly  debt exclusive  of mortgages.  Third,  Ludvigson's  test was whether  consumption 
growth  was related  to predictable  debt growth,  while our test is a more  direct  test of the 
Campbell-Mankiw  model: whether lagged debt growth matters. Finally,  Ludvigson 
was using the standard Campbell-Mankiw  model as her baseline rather than the 
sentiment-augmented model we  are using [although our result that lagged debt 
growth is insignificant  holds up even when we estimate  a standard  (non-sentiment- 
augmented)  Campbell-Mankiw  model]. 174 ?  CARROLL  & DUNN 
and YGAP. We also added four lags of income growth and the unemploy- 
ment expectations  variable to each equation.16 
Our own measure of annuity labor income (A?UrS)  is created by forecast- 
ing  the  present  discounted  value  of  the  sum  of the  next  two  years  of 
labor income  using  a  set  of  forecasting  variables  drawn  from  Carroll, 
Fuhrer, and  Wilcox's  (1994) set  of instruments  for income  growth.  We 
make the assumption  that beyond  two years income is expected  to grow 
at a constant rate equal to the average growth rate over the entire sample 
period.  Using  this growth rate, we calculate the annuity value of income 
from two years to infinity and add this to the forecasted discounted  sum 
of income  over  the next two  years  to get A?UrS.  For more details on the 
two methods  of constructing  annuity  income,  see the companion  meth- 
odology  paper Carroll and Dunn  (1997). 
In principle,  if our estimate  of the innovation  to annuity income were 
perfect  (or, more  realistically,  if the  variables  we  use  to  construct  the 
measure  were  valid  instruments  for annuity  income  growth)  then  the 
following  equation  would  characterize nondurable consumption  growth 
in the Campbell-Mankiw  model: 
A log Ct =  (1 - A) Et_lp-(rt -  8) + A  log Yt +  (1 -  A)  log At.  (1) 
Hence  we  could  obtain an estimate  of the fraction of income accruing to 
rule-of-thumb  consumers  from the coefficient  on actual current income 
growth  in  a  regression  of  consumption  growth  on  current  income 
growth  and  the  current innovations  to annuity  income.17 Table 2 pres- 
ents the results  when  equation  (1) is estimated  using  our two measures 
of annuity  income. 
The first regression  shows  that the lagged level of UE and the current 
innovation to our measure  of annuity  income are roughly equally impor- 
tant in explaining  current consumption  growth.  The second  regression 
shows  that when  the current innovation  to UE is added  to the equation, 
neither  it nor the innovation  to annuity  income  is individually  statisti- 
16. We are grateful  to David Reifschneider  at the Federal  Reserve  for explaining  the FRB- 
US methodology  to us. Because  we are  adapting  the FRB-US  methodology  to a purpose 
quite different  from its intended purpose, and because we are using a different  mea- 
sure of income, any empirical  inadequacies  of the annuity income measure we con- 
struct  using the FRB-US  methodology should be laid at our doorstep, not the FRB-US 
model staff's. 
17. This point relies heavily on the assumption  that  our  estimate  of annuity  income  growth 
correctly  captures  all the implications  for annuity income of the innovation  to current 
income. However, we do include current  income growth among the variables  used to 
construct  annuity income, so in principle  any such information  is indeed included. Unemployment  Expectations,  Jumping  Triggers,  Household  Balance  Sheets  * 175 
Table  2  EFFECTS  OF INNOVATIONS  ON NONDURABLES 
CONSUMPTIONa 
Row  A  log Yt  A log A  s  AlogARB-U  UEt_1  AUE,  R2  D-W 
1  0.326  0.186  -0.833  0.33  1.83 
(3.15)***  (2.82)***  -(2.55)*** 
2  0.324  0.124  -1.003  -0.907  0.34  1.92 
(3.15)***  (1.59)  -(2.92)***  -(1.52) 
3  0.391  0.189  -0.654  0.29  1.92 
(3.41)***  (1.20)  -(2.00)** 
4  0.394  0.000  -0.981  -1.413  0.32  2.00 
(3.50)***  (0.00)  -(2.83)***  -(2.47)** 
aDependent  variable  is nondurable  consumption  growth,  quarterly  data, 1963:3-1994:3.  *, significant  at 
10%  or better;  **, at 5% or better;  ***,  at 1% or better. t-Statistics  are listed in parentheses  below 
coefficient  estimates. Standard  errors were constructed  using a serial-correlation-robust  covariance 
matrix  (allowing  serial  correlation  at lags up to 8). Yt  is total  household  wage and transfer  income.  At  is 
annuity labor income. UEt_I is the unemployment  expectations  index. A constant  term was also in- 
cluded  but is not reported. 
cally significant; however,  the lagged level of UE remains important. The 
last two  regressions  show  that, after controlling  for unemployment  ex- 
pectations,  the FRB-US measure  of annuity  income  provides  no further 
information  about consumption  growth at all. 
In sum,  the standard model  of nondurable  consumption  growth,  the 
Campbell-Mankiw  model,  implies  that consumption  growth  should  be 
related to two variables: income  growth  and the innovations  to annuity 
income.  Our empirical work shows  that unemployment  expectations  are 
at least as important as either of these  traditional variables in explaining 
nondurables  consumption  growth.  Lagged  balance-sheet  variables,  on 
the other hand,  are essentially  uncorrelated with nondurable  consump- 
tion growth  once unemployment  expectations  are controlled for. 
2.2 BALANCE  SHEETS  AND SPENDING  ON DURABLE  GOODS 
AND HOUSING 
The standard CEQ PIH model  described  above applies  to consumption 
of nondurable  goods  and services.  However,  as Mankiw (1982) showed, 
the model can be expanded  to provide implications about durable-goods 
spending  if sufficient assumptions  are made. In particular, if there are no 
transactions  costs associated  with durable-goods  purchases  and if dura- 
ble  goods  enter  the  utility  function  in  a  Cobb-Douglas  manner,  it is 176 *  CARROLL & DUNN 
Table 3  CONSUMPTION  OF DURABLES, BASELINE EQUATIONa 
Annuity 
income 
measure  At_l/At  Primet  UEt_1  AUEt  YA  R2  D-W 
AOurs  -0.213  -0.115  -2.326  0.702  0.219  0.44  0.55 
-(3.22)***  -(3.16)***  -(6.11)***  (1.03)  (2.80)*** 
AFRB-US  0.329  -0.136  -2.931  -1.246  0.328  0.75  0.83 
(2.65)***  -(4.97)***  -(9.35)***  -(2.07)**  (10.40)*** 
At =  Yt  -0.368  -0.104  -1.809  0.475  0.058  0.52  0.56 
-(3.24)***  -(2.71)***  -(3.73)***  (0.65)  (0.73) 
aDependent  variable  is the ratio of durables  consumption  to annuity labor  income, 1963:3-1994:3.  * 
significant  at 10%  or better;  **,  at 5%  or better;  ***,  at 1%  or better.  t-Statistics  are listed in parentheses 
below coefficient  estimates. Standard  errors  were constructed  using a serial-correlation-robust  covari- 
ance matrix  (allowing  serial  correlation  at lags up to 18). Primet  is the prime  rate. Yt is total  household 
wage and transfer  income, and At is annuity labor  income. UEt_I  is the unemployment  expectations 
index. The balance-sheet  variables  are the growth in total household liabilities  (A log Dr_-), the debt 
service burden (rDt_l/Yt_l),  and the ratio of total household liabilities  to annuity income (Dt_l/At_l). 
Household net worth, the ratio of current  income to annuity income, and a constant  term were also 
included  as independent  variables  but are not reported. 
possible  to show  that the ratio of the stock of durable goods  Zt to annuity 
income  At should  be constant18: 
Zt =  At.  (2) 
Expenditure  on  durable  goods  in this  case  will  be determined  by two 
factors: the spending  needed  to counteract depreciation,  and the spend- 
ing required to adjust the stock of durable goods  to any changes  in the 
level of annuity  income: 
E  =  Z  -(1  -  8)Zt-l  (3) 
Ef/At =  o -  (1 -  8)wAt_l1At.  (4) 
Table 3 presents  empirical results  when  we  estimate  an equation  like 
(4) using  U.S.  NIPA data  on  durables  expenditures,  augmented  with 
18. The assumption of frictionless  adjustment  is of course unattractive  for durable  goods, 
as many authors  have pointed out. For  an excellent  discussion  of the literature  and of 
the difficulties,  see Bertola  and Caballero  (1990),  who also propose  a sophisticated  (and 
complicated) method of estimating the process for durables expenditures under a 
generalized  (S,s) model with fixed return  points. See also Bertola  and Caballero  (1994) 
and Eberly (1997). For reasons that will become cear in the theoretical  discussion 
below, however, these frameworks  are not well suited to addressing  the issues we are 
interested  in here of the relationship  between labor-income  uncertainty,  balance-sheet 
variables,  and spending. We therefore  adopt the approach  of estimating  as simple an 
empirical  model as possible, with an eye to finding  any correlations  sufficiently  robust 
that any theoretical  model should be consistent  with them. Unemployment  Expectations,  Jumping  Triggers,  Household  Balance  Sheets  *  177 
UEt_1  and AUEt. We also include: the ratio of current income  to annuity 
income,  to allow  some  scope  for current income  to affect spending  di- 
rectly; the prime rate, to allow a channel for interest rates; and the ratio 
of net worth to annuity  income  (not shown  in the table, to save space; it 
was  usually  not  statistically  significant).  We present  results  separately 
for our estimate  of annuity  income,  the annuity  income  estimate  based 
on  the FRB-US methodology,  and the  analogous  results  where  we  use 
current  income  rather  than  an  estimate  of  annuity  income.19 We  ex- 
perimented  with  several  methods  of  removing  low-frequency  move- 
ments  or trends  in the data, but they  had little effect and are therefore 
not included.20 
When the measure of annuity income is AOurs, the annuity income ratio 
At-_/At gets  the  correct (negative)  sign  (implying  that strong growth  in 
annuity  income  from  t  -  1 to  t is  associated  with  high  durables  pur- 
chases),  as  does  the  interest  rate Primet. However,  the lagged  level  of 
unemployment  expectations  is much  more  statistically significant  than 
either annuity income or interest rates. Once again, the change in unem- 
ployment  expectations  does  not  enter significantly.  Finally, the ratio of 
current income  to annuity  income,  which  plays no role in determining 
durables  spending  in the  CEQ PIH model,  is also highly  significant  in 
our regressions.  This result differs from Bemanke  (1984), who  found  in 
household  data that transitory shocks  to income  had no effect on dura- 
bles purchases.  The discrepancy suggests  either that our annuity income 
measures  are imperfect or that consumers  do in fact buy durables when 
they receive windfalls. 
The second  row of the table presents  results when  annuity income  is 
measured  using the FRB-US methodology.  The main difference in results 
is that the  annuity-income  ratio now  receives  the wrong  sign.  The last 
row of the table shows  the results when  current income,  rather than an 
estimate  of annuity  income,  is used  as a divisor.  Results  are generally 
similar to those  for our measure of annuity income. 
The  top  panel  of Table 4 shows  the  results  when  our balance-sheet 
variables  are added  to the baseline  durables  regression.21 The debt-to- 
19. For the Y/At variable,  we use the ratio of current  income to our estimate of annuity 
income. 
20. The Durbin-Watson  statistics in the table indicate a large amount of positive serial 
correlation  in durables  spending. Mankiw  (1982)  shows that in the model we use the 
level of spending should follow a white-noise  process, and so the empirical  finding of 
severe serial correlation  is inconsistent  with the model. Caballero  (1993)  shows, how- 
ever, that an (S,s) model implies precisely  such slow adjustment.  Because  our theoreti- 
cal model is essentially  an expanded (S,s) model, Caballero's  (1993)  logic should apply 
to our model as well. 
21. For brevity, we  report only  the  results  for A?r". Conclusions  are similar for AFRBUS. Table 4  CONSUMPTION  OF DURABLES AND  LAGGED BALANCE-SHEET VARIABLESa 
Balance-sheet 
Row/Measure  At-_/At  Primet  UEt1  AUEt  Y/At  measure  R2  D-W 
Entire  sample period  (1963:3-1994:3) 
1  log Dt_I  -0.185  -0.095  -1.131  0.790  0.150  0.377  0.54  0.85 
-(3.13)***  -(2.95)***  -(2.45)**  (1.27)  (2.13)**  (4.22)*** 
2 rDt_l/Yt-1  -0.217  -0.103  -2.906  0.497  0.183  0.413  0.50  0.65 
-(3.22)***  -(3.54)***  -(6.97)***  (0.79)  (2.27)**  (2.94)*** 
3 Dt_l/Atl  -0.220  -0.115  -2.229  0.415  0.299  -0.027  0.48  0.57 
-(3.46)***  -(3.20)***  -(6.57)***  (0.64)  (5.13)***  -(2.64)*** 
Before  financial liberalization  (1963:3-1980:1) 
4 A log Dt_1  -0.196  -0.007  -2.025  -0.407  0.236  0.180  0.79  1.77 
-(4.22)***  -(0.31)  -(7.87)***  -(0.95)  (7.79)***  (3.91)*** 
5 rDt_/Yt1  -0.189  -0.017  -2.527  -0.682  0.273  0.010  0.75  1.53 
-(3.52)***  -(0.74)  -(10.10)***  -(1.40)  (8.63)***  (0.06) 
6 Dt_l/At-1  -0.143  -0.106  -2.098  -0.670  0.275  0.057  0.78  1.65 
-(2.62)***  -(2.02)**  (6.97)***  -(1.45)  (9.32)***  (2.43)** 
aDependent  variable  is the ratio  of durables  consumption  to annuity  labor  income.  *, significant  at 10%  or better;  **,  at 5%  or  better;  **, 
at 1%  or better. t-Statistics  are listed in parentheses below coefficient  estimates. Standard  errors were constructed  using a serial- 
correlation-robust  covariance  matrix  (allowing  serial  correlation  at lags up to 18).  Prime,  is the prime  rate. Ytis  total  household  wage and 
transfer  income, and At is our measure  of annuity labor  income. UEt_I  is the unemployment  expectations  index. The balance-sheet 
variables  are the growth  in total  household liabilities  (4 log Dt_ ), the debt  service  burden  (rD_ /Yt_ ), and the ratio  of total  household 
liabilities  to annuity  income (D,_I/Atj1).  Household  net worth, the ratio  of current  income  to annuity  income, and a constant  term  were 
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annuity-income  ratio again  gets  a negative  and  significant  coefficient 
using  our measure  of annuity  income.  However,  both  the lagged  debt 
growth  and the lagged  debt service burden are positive  and significant. 
Note  that this is the  opposite  of what  would  be expected  if precarious 
balance-sheet  conditions  tended  to deter consumers  from spending.  In- 
stead,  the  regressions  indicate  that consumers  tend  to spend  more on 
durable goods  during  periods  when  the  debt service burden  has been 
high or recent debt growth has been high.  The obvious  interpretation is 
that these  results  reflect a simultaneity  problem: factors that cause con- 
sumers  to be  willing  to  spend  heavily  on  durable goods  also  tend  to 
make  them  willing  to tolerate high  debt  service burdens  or rapid debt 
growth  or high ratios of debt to assets. 
One  specific  hypothesis  is that the  simultaneity  problem reflects the 
financial liberalization of the 1980s, which may have allowed  consumers 
to borrow more in order to purchase durable goods.  If this explanation is 
correct, the statistical significance  of the relationship between  the dura- 
bles spending  ratio and balance-sheet  variables should  have been much 
weaker in the period before financial liberalization. The bottom panel of 
the table therefore presents  results for the same sets of regressions,  but 
restricting the  sample  to the period before  1980. Evidence  for the debt 
service burden is consistent  with the liberalization hypothesis:  it is insig- 
nificant during the earlier time period. The results for lagged debt growth 
also lend some support to the idea; although the variable remains highly 
statistically  significant,  the coefficient  estimates  for the pre-1980 period 
are about half of their values  over the entire period.  Finally, the debt-to- 
annuity-income  ratio now  receives  a positive and significant coefficient. 
We now  briefly examine  the evidence  on spending  on what  Saddam 
Hussein  might  call the  mother  of  all durable goods:  housing.  Table 5 
presents  regressions  patterned  on  our  durable-goods  regressions,  but 
where  the  dependent  variable is the  number  of homes  sold  per capita 
and  the  interest  rate is  the  average  rate on  new  mortgages.22 For the 
baseline  regression  specification,  the  results  are  remarkably  similar 
(given  the  totally  independent  sources  of  data) to  those  for durables 
spending:  Coefficient  estimates  on every variable are betweeen  two and 
four times  the coefficient  estimates  in the durables regression,  and the 
patterns  of  statistical  significance  are also very  similar. Results  for the 
balance-sheet  variables are also similar to those  for the durables regres- 
sions,  though  more  exaggerated,  in that both lagged  debt  growth  and 
22. To save  space in the table, we  do not report the coefficient on a trend variable, which 
was  highly  statistically  significant  in all regressions.  We obtained  similar results with 
alternative  methods  of  detrending.  We also  report  results  only  for our  measure  of 
annuity  income. Table 5  TOTAL HOME SALES" 
Balance-sheet 
Row/Measure  At_lIAt  Mortt  UEt_  AUEt  Y/At  measure  R2  D-W 
1  -0.929  -0.698  -7.471  -1.541  1.172  0.51  0.33 
-(3.48)***  -(4.82)***  -(4.21)***  -(0.70)  (2.99)*** 
2 A log Dt_1  -0.681  -0.600  -2.341  -1.721  0.784  1.306  0.62  0.85 
-(2.79)***  -(4.82)***  -(1.27)  -(0.77)  (2.54)***  (3.78)*** 
3 rDt_l/Yt1  -0.896  -0.499  -8.962  -2.834  1.226  0.920  0.51  0.34 
-(3.21)***  -(2.23)**  -(5.08)***  -(1.56)  (3.20)***  (1.26) 
4 Dt_l/At_1  -0.709  -0.600  -8.679  -4.295  1.206  0.205  0.58  0.42 
-(2.50)**  -(4.84)***  -(4.66)***  -(2.38)**  (3.34)***  (2.85)*** 
aDependent  variable  is total home sales per capita,  1972:3-1990:1.  Annuity  income  constructed  using our method. *, significant  at 10% 
or better;  **,  at 5%  or better;  ***  at 1%  or better. t-Statistics  are listed in parentheses  below coefficient  estimates.  Standard  errors  were 
constructed  using a serial-correlation-robust  coveriance  matrix  (allowing  serial  correlation  at lags up to 18).  The measure  of home sales is 
new and existing single-family  home sales per capita. Mortt is the effective rate on conventional  home mortgage  loans. Yt is total 
household  wage and transfer  income, and Ais annuity  labor  income. UE_1  is the unemployment  expectations  index. The  balance-sheet 
variables  are the growth  in total household liabilities  (A log Dt_l), the debt service  burden  (rDt_l/Yt_l), and the ratio  of total  household 
liabilities  to annuity income (Dt_l/At_1). Household net worth, a constant  term, and a 9-year  centered  moving average  of home sales 
were also included  as independent  variables  but are not reported. Unemployment  Expectations,  Jumping  Triggers,  Household  Balance  Sheets  *  181 
lagged  debt service burden  receive coefficients  more than four times  as 
large  as  in  the  durables  regressions.  However,  the  lagged  debt-to- 
annuity-income  ratio, which  received  a negative  and  significant  coeffi- 
cient in our baseline durables regressions,  is positive and significant here. 
Our  conclusion  is  that  spending  on  durables  and  housing  is  very 
robustly  correlated  with  lagged  unemployment  expectations.  It is also 
highly  correlated with our measure of annuity-income  growth,  and with 
the ratio of current income  to annuity income.  However,  with the excep- 
tion  of debt growth,  durables  spending  is not robustly  correlated with 
any balance-sheet  measure we examined.23 Given the enormous changes 
in the U.S.  financial system  over the period our data covers,  and given 
the endogenous  nature of balance-sheet  positions,  it is perhaps not sur- 
prising that most balance-sheet  measures do not bear any stable relation- 
ship  to  spending.  Indeed,  the  surprise  may be  that one  balance-sheet 
measure,  debt growth,  does seem  to bear a relatively stable relationship 
to  spending.  We therefore  turn now  to an exploration  of the  determi- 
nants of debt growth. 
2.3 THE  CYCLICAL  DYNAMICS  OF DEBT  GROWTH 
Aside  from the  sharp increase  in the  debt ratio beginning  in  the  mid- 
1980s, perhaps  the most interesting  feature of our Figure 1 was that debt 
appears  to  exhibit  a  distinct  cyclical  pattern: its  growth  rate is  much 
slower  during  recessions  (the shaded  regions  of the chart) than during 
expansions. 
It is  a bit  difficult  to  pin  down  the  representative-agent  CEQ PIH 
model's  implications  for debt,  because  the model  does  not  distinguish 
debt from assets;  aggregate  net worth  and human  wealth  are sufficient 
statistics  for aggregate  behavior.  Of course,  the vast majority of debt is 
associated  with  purchases  of homes  and other durable goods,  so to the 
extent  that  our earlier empirical work  captures  the  dynamics  of home 
sales and durables purchases,  the remaining interesting  question  to ask 
about debt growth is what else it is correlated with.  The way we answer 
this question  empirically is to see what variables are statistically signifi- 
cant explanators  of debt growth  once  we  control for contemporaneous 
home  sales.  The results are presented  in Table 6. 
As usual,  the first variable we examine is lagged unemployment  expec- 
tations; as usual,  it is highly  statistically significant  and negative.  Debt 
growth  is also negatively  correlated with  the change  in unemployment 
23. This conclusion  is consistent  with recent  work by Gamer  (1996),  who found that most 
measures  of the household debt burden  do not Granger-cause  durable-goods  expendi- 
tures or GDP,  and McCarthy  (1997),  who finds in a VAR  framework  that debt measures 
have little effect on subsequent  nondurable-  or durable-goods  spending. Table 6  DETERMINANTS OF DEBT GROWTHa 
Balance-sheet 
Row/Measure  Ht  UE_1  AUEt  A log A?"s  measure  0  SSR  D-W 
1  0.196  0.539  0.59  2.46 
(4.64)***  (5.85)*** 
2  0.140  -2.169  0.244  0.55  2.15 
(5.79)***  -(5.72)***  (2.15)** 
3  0.131  -2.864  -1.970  0.306  0.49  2.21 
(5.78)***  -(6.34)***  -(3.90)***  (2.72)*** 
4  0.133  -2.536  0.180  0.202  0.51  2.12 
(6.35)***  -(7.38)***  (3.90)***  (1.69)* 
5  0.130  -2.867  -1.662  0.059  0.287  0.49  2.19 
(5.90)***  -(6.41)***  -(2.42)**  (0.79)  (2.51)*** 
6 A log Dt,_  0.045  -1.385  0.588  -0.443  0.48  2.07 
(2.98)***  -(5.25)***  (7.84)***  -(6.42)*** 
7 rDt_1/Yt1  0.133  -2.345  0.063  0.218  0.54  2.13 
(6.12)***  -(6.09)***  (0.82)  (1.86)* 
8 Dt_/At_-  0.147  -2.063  -0.004  0.259  0.54  2.17 
(5.85)***  -(5.17)***  -(0.60)  (2.24)** 
aDependent  variable is A log Dt, growth  in total household  liabilities: quarterly data, 1968:2-1994:3. *, significant  at 10% or better; **, at 
5% or better; ***, at 1% or better.  t-Statistics are listed  in parentheses  below  coefficient  estimates.  Ht is home  sales  per capita and At is 
annuity  income.  UEt_i  is the unemployment  expectations  index.  The balance-sheet  variables are the lagged  dependent  variable (A log 
Dt_l),  the debt service  burden  (rDt_l/Yt_1), and the ratio of total household  liabilities to annuity  income  (Dt_l/At_l).  0 is the estimated 
coefficient on the moving-average  error term. A constant  term was  also included  but is not reported. Unemployment  Expectations,  Jumping  Triggers,  Household  Balance  Sheets  * 183 
expectations,  although  (as  usual)  at  a  much  lower  level  of  statistical 
significance  than the correlation with the lagged level.  Again,  a possible 
interpretation is that the statistical significance of these variables owes  to 
some  correlation they have with the level of future income; but, as in all 
our  previous  regressions,  when  a measure  of  the  change  in  annuity 
income  is  added  to  the  equation,  the  statistical significance  of lagged 
unemployment  expectations  is unaffected  (although the annuity-income 
growth  variable is also significant).  Finally, debt growth  is uncorrelated 
with  the  lagged  values  of our other  two  balance-sheet  variables but is 
significantly  positively  autocorrelated. 
These  regressions  suggest  that there  is  an independent  channel  for 
unemployment  expectations  in influencing  debt  growth,  even  beyond 
whatever  effects  unemployment  expectations  have  on home  sales.  Be- 
cause  we  found  earlier that the  pace  of home  sales  is itself  negatively 
influenced  by unemployment  expectations,  in a sense these results imply 
that unemployment  expectations  are doubly important for debt growth. 
Implicit in our entire discussion  up to this point has been an assump- 
tion  that  the  pattern  of  debt  over  the business  cycle is determined  by 
consumers'  unconstrained  choices.  An alternative possibility is that debt 
growth  slows  over  the business  cycle not because  consumers  desire  to 
borrow  less  but  because  lenders  restrict credit.  A large literature now 
exists suggesting  that lenders tighten credit standards to businesses  dur- 
ing  recessions,  so  that only  high-quality  borrowers  are able to borrow 
freely  in  bad  times;  see  Bernanke,  Gertler, and  Gilchrist  (1996) for  a 
survey.  A recent  paper  by Bemanke,  Ferri, and  Simon  (1997) presents 
evidence  from the Federal Reserve's Survey  of Consumer  Finances  suggest- 
ing that a similar phenomenon  may afflict consumers. 
One way to identify  demand and supply effects is to examine a form of 
mortgages for which there should be no cyclical effect on supply. The best 
candidate here is mortgages  issued  by the Veterans' Administration,  be- 
cause by law these mortgages are available to all qualified former military 
personnel.  Because the government  assumes  the default risk, the supply 
of this form of mortgage financing should not fluctuate over the cycle even 
if lenders  become  more  risk-averse  in recessions.  Indeed,  because  the 
government  bears the risk of VA mortgages,  one would  expect to see  a 
relative  increase in the  supply  of VA mortgages.  If the  supply  of other 
forms of credit does decline, we would also expect to see an increase in the 
relative demand  for VA mortgages;  hence  any declines  in VA mortgage 
issuance  over  the  cycle probably underestimate  the pure demand  effect. 
Figure 3 plots  the number of VA mortgages  originated in each quarter 
since 1981, together with total mortgages originated over the same period. 
There is clearly a strong correlation between  VA mortgages  and non-VA 184 *  CARROLL  & DUNN 
Figure  3 VA  MORTGAGE  ORIGINATIONS  AND TOTAL  MORTGAGE 
ORIGINATIONS  OVER  TREND  GDP 
VA_LOANS 
-  -  -  ALL_LOANS 
A 
1984  1987  1990  1993 
1981 
1981 
mortgages.  Furthermore,  during  the two  recessions  in the  sample,  VA 
mortgages  appear to fall, if anything,  by more than non-VA mortgages. 
This evidence  strongly  suggests  that demand  factors play a very impor- 
tant role in fluctuations  in mortgage borrowing  over the business  cycle. 
This  completes  our  discussion  of  the  cyclical characteristics  of  con- 
sumption  spending,  home  sales,  and  household  balance  sheets.  We 
draw  several  conclusions.  First,  spending  for nondurables,  durables, 
and housing  all generally  responds  to changes  in annuity  income  (or at 
least  our  measure  of  annuity  income)  in  the  direction  implied  by  the 
frictionless  CEQ PIH model,  although  the magnitude  of the response  is 
generally not nearly so large as the model would  predict. Second,  unem- 
ployment  expectations  typically seem to play at least as important a role 
as changes  in annuity  income in determining  spending  decisions.  How- 
ever,  most  of  the  information  content  of  unemployment  expectations 
variables  is captured  by the  lagged level of unemployment  expectations 
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rather than by  the  change  in unemployment  expectations.  Finally, the 
only measure of household  balance-sheet  positions  that is robustly corre- 
lated with  spending  is the lagged  growth rate of debt. 
We turn now  to the question  of whether  a model which incorporates a 
serious treatment of uncertainty, transactions costs, and liquid assets can 
explain the broad pattern of our empirical results. 
3.  The  Model 
3.1 THEORY 
The  consumer's  objective  is  to  maximize  expected  discounted  utility 
from consumption  of housing  services Z and nonhousing  goods  C. The 
period  utility  function  is CRRA in a Cobb-Douglas  aggregate  of utility 
from nonhousing  consumption  and the stock of housing: 
(Cl-aZta)l-p 
u(C,,Z,)=  ,  (5) 
i-p  1 -  p 
where p = 2 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
There  are five  state  variables  which  constrain  or influence  the  con- 
sumer's choice of C and Z: the current stock of spendable resources Xt [the 
sum of wealth and current labor income Y,;  or "cash-on-hand" in Deaton's 
(1991) terminology],  the size of the home  (if any) the consumer  owns  at 
the beginning  of the period  H-, the level  of the consumer's  permanent 
labor income Pt, an indicator It  for the aggregate state of the economy, and 
the consumer's  current employment  status Jt  (for  job). Note that we do not 
list mortgage  debt as one of the state variables. This is because we make 
sufficient assumptions  to guarantee that the ratio of the mortgage debt to 
home value is constant,  thereby reducing the number of state variables in 
the problem by one. The critical assumption  is that the mortgage payment 
in each period contains a term that corresponds to the depreciation rate of 
the  home.  Hence  the  balance  owed  on  the  mortgage  shrinks  in  each 
period by the same fraction that the value of the home  shrinks. 
The consumer's  choices  within  each period are determined  as follows 
(and  as  summarized  in  the  table below).  First the  consumer  makes  a 
homeownership  decision.  If the consumer begins  the period owning  no 
house  (H- =  0),  the  decision  is whether  or not to buy  a house,  whose 
value we will denote  Ht =  Pt,  i.e.,  we assume that consumers must by a 
house  whose  value is equal to 4 = 3 times their real after-tax permanent 
income,  in accord with standard rules of thumb in the housing  industry, 
(see  Fannie  Mae Foundation,  1997). Buyers must  also  put  up  a down 
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taxes in amount b = 0.03. Renters purchase housing  services in optimally 
chosen  amount  Zt at price qA, where  A is  the  flow  cost  of homeown- 
ership,24 and the restriction q =  1.5 >  1 gives  consumers  an incentive  to 
buy. If the consumer  begins  the period as a homeowner,  they can sell the 
house  and rent (implying Hf = 0), keep the house  they currently own (Hf 
=  Ht,), or sell the current house  and buy a new  one.  For homeowners, 
the flow  of housing  services  is equal to the size  of the house,  Z, =  HI. 
Given  our assumption  that debt  depreciates  at the  same  rate as the 
house,  the  outstanding  amount  of  debt  will  always  be  given  by  the 
amount  (1  -  d)Ht. We assume  that this  debt must  be serviced  in each 
period  by a fixed  mortgage  payment  m =  S +  r, where  r =  0.02 is the 
after-tax real rate of return and  8 =  0.02 is the depreciation  rate of the 
house.  The presence  of the term 6 in the mortgage  payment  represents 
the lender's  compensation  for the erosion  in the real value of debt (this 
term can be thought  of as roughly  reflecting inflation). 
Denoting  the level  of liquid assets  that the consumer  ends  the period 
holding  St, we can summarize  the foregoing possibilities  in the following 
table: 
Initial 
status  Period-t  action(s)  St (end-of-period  savings)  Ht  Zt 
H1 = 0  Keep renting  Xt -  Ct -  qAZ  0  Optimal 
H=  0  Buy  Xt -  Ct -  (d + b)IH  -  [m(l -  d) + n]H  OPt  Ht 
H  0  See and rent  Xt -  Ct + (d -  b)lH  -  qkZt  0  Optimal 
H  > 0  Hold  Xt -C-  [m(l -  d) + n]-ft  Ht  gI 
H  >0O Sellandbuy  Xt -  Ct + (d-  b)HI-  -  (d + b)Hft  bP  Ht 
-[m(l  -  d) +  n]Ht  _  w~~~~ 
We are now  in  position  to write  down  the  consumer's  optimization 
problem.  The consumer  of course  has  no influence  over the aggregate 
state;  furthermore,  for  simplicity  we  assume  that  the  consumer's  job 
status  and permanent  income  also evolve  exogenously.  Hence  the con- 
trol variables  potentially  available to the consumer  are three: C,He, and 
Z. The Bellman equation  is therefore 
Vt(Xt,  ,  It,  Jt,  Pt) =  maxu(Ct,  Zt) +  3EtVt+l (Xt+l,HtJ+lIt+1Jt+,Pt+l), 
{Ct,Zt,Ht} 
where  all notation  is standard and  6 =  0.96 is the time-discount  factor. 
24. Equal  to the lost interest  on the capital  tied up in the house plus depreciation  costs plus 
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The level of permanent  labor income is assumed  to follow a first-order 
Markov process  with drift parameter G,,1: 
Pt+l = Gt+lPtt+l,  (6) 
where Ht+1  is a stochastic shock to permanent labor income, and Gt+1  is the 
mean  growth  rate for the  permanent  income  of employed  consumers 
given  the aggregate  state that prevails in period t +  1. With this process 
for permanent  labor income,  along with the fact that the utility function 
is homogeneous  of degree zero,25 it is possible  to rewrite the problem in 
terms of ratios of C, Z, X, and Hb to permanent  labor income,  thus  ef- 
fectively  reducing  the number of state variables to four. Specifically, de- 
fining ct =  C/Pt and z,  xt, and h' similarly, the problem can be written as 
vt(xt,h,It,Jt)  =  max  u(ct,zt) +3Et(Gt+l,It+l)l-Pvt+l(xt+l,ht+l,It+l,,t+).  (7) 
{ct,zt,h t} 
We assume  that the level of actual labor income in period t is given by 
the level of permanent  labor income multiplied by a transitory shock  !t: 
Yt = PtIt.  (8) 
The consumer's  decisions  within  the period determine  the size of the 
housing  stock at the end of the period Ht and the amount of liquid assets 
(or savings)  on  hand  at the  end  of the  period  St subject to a liquidity 
constraint that requires St -  0. Given Ht and St, the levels  of beginning- 
of-period housing  Hb  and cash on hand in period t +  1 are given by 
Ht+l =  (1 -  )H, 
Xt+l =  RSt +  Yt+l, 
where  R =  1.02 is the annual gross interest rate between  periods.  Divid- 
ing both  sides  of both  of these  equations  by Pt+l and substituting  from 
the permanent-labor-income  equation  (6) yields 
htb  = 
G 
i 
t+l  t-1 
R 
Xt+l =  St + lt+.- 
Gt+1lt+l 
25. Plus certain conditions  that must be (and are) satisfied by the constraints. 188 - CARROLL  & DUNN 
3.2 THE  AGGREGATE  STATE 
Following  the work of Sichel (1993, 1994), we assume  that the aggregate 
economy  has  three  states: recessions,  which  are characterized by high 
job loss  risk and low  aggregate  growth; booms,  which  are characterized 
by low  job loss  risk and high  aggregate  growth:  and recoveries,  which 
always  follow  recessions  and which  exhibit high growth but continuing 
high job loss risk.26  Transitions between  these states are governed  by the 
following  Markov transition matrix: 
Period-t  + 1 aggregate  state 
Expansion  Contraction Recovery 
Period-t  Expansion  0.95  0.05  0 
aggregate  Contraction  0.05  0.70  0.25 
state  Recovery  0.25  0.05  0.70 
where  the  switching  probabilities  were  chosen  to match  the  empirical 
fraction of the time the economy  has spent in expansion  vs.  contraction 
in the postwar  United  States,  and the probabilities for the recovery pe- 
riod  were  chosen  so  that  recoveries  would  last  for  four  quarters  on 
average  and  so that the probability of slipping  from recovery back into 
recession  would  be  the  same  as the probability of entering  a recession 
from an expansion. 
3.3 THE  HOUSEHOLD  INCOME  PROCESS 
3.3.1  The Employment  State  Unemployment  spells last one or two peri- 
ods,  and when  consumers  lose  their jobs, they know  whether  the spell 
will be a one- or a two-period  spell (we chose  this structure to allow the 
average  spell  length  to be longer  during recessions  than during expan- 
sions).  Consumers  in the last period of an unemployment  spell face the 
same employment  hazards as employed  consumers; thus a very unlucky 
consumer  could experience  two (or even  more) unemployment  spells in 
a row.  Designating  the  status  employed  as  E,  unemployed  with  one 
remaining  quarter of unemployment  as U1, and unemployed  with  two 
remaining  quarters as  U2, we  assume  the  employment  state transition 
matrix in expansions  is 
26. The "recovery"  phase allows our model to capture  the fact that the unemployment 
rate typically remains higher than average for an extended period after the NBER 
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Period-t  + 1 status 
E  U1  U2 
Period-  E  0.97  0.01  0.02 
t  U1  0.97  0.01  0.02 
status  U2  0  1  0 
while  we assume  that in contractions and recoveries the matrix is 
Period-t  + 1 status 
E  U1  U2 
Period-  E  0.96  0  0.04 
t  UL  0.96  0  0.04 
status  U2  0  1  0 
where  the transition  probabilities were  chosen  to generate  steady-state 
unemployment  rates around  5% in expansions  and 8% in contractions 
and recoveries  (by "steady-state" we  mean the rate that would  eventu- 
ally prevail if the economy  remained in the expansion,  or contraction, or 
recovery for many periods). 
3.3.2  The Transitory  Shocks  Transitory shocks  to income  are drawn  for 
all employed  consumers  in  each  period  from a three-point  symmetric 
distribution  with  mean  one  and  equal probability mass  on  each of the 
three possible  draws.  Thus the possible  draws are (1 -  ve, 1, 1 +  Ve) in 
expansions  and (1 -  vr, 1, 1 + vcr)  in contractions and recoveries,  v" _  ve 
(in practice we assume  transitory shocks are of equal size in all aggregate 
states,  vr  =  ve  =  0.1).  Unemployed  consumers  receive  unemployment 
compensation  in amount  YPt with  certainty, where  we  assume  that the 
replacement  rate Y = 0.5 does  not vary with the cycle. 
3.4 THE  PERMANENT  SHOCKS 
For employed  consumers,  permanent  shocks  to income,  like transitory 
shocks,  are drawn in each quarter from a three-point symmetric distribu- 
tion  with  mean  one  and  equal  probability  mass  on  each  of  the  three 
possible  draws.  We assume  the three possibilities  are (0.95, 1.00, 1.05) in 
all three  aggregate  states,  which  amounts  to  a conservative  estimate, 
given  that  microeconomic  studies  typically  estimate  that the  standard 
deviation  of the annual innovation  to permanent  income  is at least 10% 
(see  Carroll, 1992, for a brief survey).  We assume  that unemployment 
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taking jobs at a level of permanent  income  that is on average 10% lower 
than  the  permanent  income  associated  with  their previous  job (this is 
one  of  the  few  statistics  we  were  able to calibrate using  existing  data 
from the labor economics  literature; see,  e.g.,  Carrington,  1993, for evi- 
dence  on the typical size  of wage  losses).  However,  we  were unable  to 
find evidence  on how  this statistic varies over the business  cycle,  so we 
assume  that it is the same in all three aggregate states. We again assume 
a three-point  symmetric  distribution  with  equal probability weights  on 
all three outcomes,  but we assume  that the shock process during contrac- 
tions  and  recoveries  is a mean-preserving  spread  of the  shock  process 
during expansions.  Specifically, the possible  outcomes  are (0.8, 0.9,  1.0) 
in booms  and (0.7, 0.9,  1.1) in contractions and recoveries. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
Although  the  model  can  be  solved  for quite  general  combinations  of 
parameter values,  we have intentionally  kept the structure of uncertainty 
simple in order to make the model  easier to understand  and analyze.  In 
our  parametrization,  the  only  differences  in  risk  between  aggregate 
states  come  from the  fact that in recessions  and  recoveries  unemploy- 
ment  spells  are more  likely, last longer,  and are associated  with  larger 
permanent  income  shocks.  The processes  for transitory and permanent 
shocks  for  employed  consumers  are  the  same  in  all  three  aggregate 
states,  as is the  mean  of the  distribution  for permanent  shocks  for the 
unemployed.  Many of these  parameters could in principle be calibrated 
using  microeconomic  data, but we  were  not able to find many  existing 
studies  that were useful  for that purpose. 
3.6 A WISH  LIST 
In order  to  solve  the  model,  we  had  to make  a variety  of  simplifying 
assumptions.  Even so,  the full version  of the model used  for analysis of 
the effects of financial market deregulation has six state variables: the four 
described above (xt, hb, It, Jt)  plus the current value of the down-payment 
ratio d required  for new-home  purchases  and  the  value  of  the  down- 
payment  ratio that prevailed when  the consumer took out their mortgage 
loan.  The full model  takes our new  Unix workstation  four days to solve 
and  another  two  to  simulate,  so  substantially  relaxing the  simplifying 
assumptions  is not  feasible  with  present  technology.  It is nevertheless 
worthwhile  to draw attention  to the assumptions  we would  most like to 
relax as technology  advances.  First is the assumption  that the level of debt 
is perfectly correlated with the level of the housing  stock. We would have 
preferred to make assumptions  that guaranteed at least a modest buildup 
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like to relax is that there is no house price risk. Although Fratantoni (1996) 
found  that the  effects  of  this  kind  of risk were  small compared  to the 
effective  risk caused  by  the  fixed  mortgage  commitment,  it would  be 
useful  to see  whether  that result carries over into this context.  This as- 
sumption  could  obviously  interact with  the  first assumption,  because 
house  price  risk could  put  some  consumers  "under water," holding  a 
mortgage  whose  value exceeds  that of the house.  Finally, we would  like 
to allow consumers  to choose  the size of the new  house  they buy. How- 
ever, we  suspect  that this last change  would  not affect behavior much: 
because  consumers  will live in their house  for an average of ten years, it 
seems  unlikely  that transitory factors such as the current aggregate state 
should  optimally  have  much  effect on the optimal size of house  to buy. 
3.7 SOLUTION 
As  anyone  familiar with  the  recent  literature  on  consumption  under 
uncertainty  would  anticipate,  solution  of this model  was  a major chal- 
lenge.  A  short  companion  paper  (Carroll and  Dunn,  1997) briefly  de- 
scribes our solution  method,  which  involves  numerical iteration on the 
value  function.  Carroll and Kimball (1996) have shown  that even  in the 
simpler  case  where  there  is  only  a  single,  nondurable  consumption 
good,  the  consumption  policy  rule  is  strictly  concave  (and  therefore 
presumably  not  analytically  soluble)  whenever  utility  is  of  the  hyper- 
bolic  absolute  risk aversion  (HARA) form (a class  that subsumes  con- 
stant  absolute  risk  aversion  (CARA),  constant  relative  risk  aversion 
(CRRA), and  Stone-Geary  versions  of  CARA and  CRRA utility)  and 
there is both labor-income and rate-of-return risk. That paper shows  that 
there  are only  three  degenerate  cases  which  yield  linear consumption 
rules: quadratic utility, CARA utility  with  only  labor-income  risk, and 
CRRA with only rate-of-return risk. Given the lack of analytical solutions 
to even  the simpler problem for nondurable  consumption,  the resort to 
numerical methods  was  inescapable  here-even  if the fixed transaction 
costs did not add further major complications. 
Previous  work on (S,s) models  has either assumed  assumed  risk neu- 
trality of consumers  (Bertola and  Caballero, 1990) or that the  only  risk 
consumers  face  is  rate-of-return  risk  (Grossman  and  Laroque,  1990; 
Eberly, 1997) in order to exploit the linearity of the optimal consumption 
rule under power  utility [which,  under certain further assumptions,  im- 
plies  a closed-form  solution  to  even  the  more  complicated  (S,s) prob- 
lem]. A very recent paper by Caplin and Leahy (1997) makes substantial 
progress  in  deriving  empirical  implications  of  a  model  in  which  the 
marginal utility of wealth  does  not vary over the business  cycle (except 
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defensible  for  many  purposes,  they  are  obviously  unacceptable  in  a 
study  of the effects  of labor-income  uncertainty  on durables purchases. 
Despite  the mathematical difficulty of solving  the model,  the behavior 
of consumers  in it can be described reasonably  simply. Most of the time 
they are homeowners,  because  ownership  is cheaper than renting.  Dur- 
ing  most  of the  time  that they  are homeowners,  they  engage  in buffer- 
stock  saving, in which  they try to maintain a target level of liquid precau- 
tionary  assets,  which  they  use  to smooth  nonhousing  consumption  in 
the face of income  shocks  (see Deaton,  1991, and Carroll, 1992, 1997, for 
detailed  analysis  of buffer-stock  saving  behavior  in a model  with  only 
nondurable  goods).  As  the time approaches  to buy a new  home,  how- 
ever,  they  engage  in  a bit of  extra saving  in  order to  accumulate  the 
required down  payment. 
The homeownership  decision  can be described  as following  a modi- 
fied (S,s) rule. Because the value of the house  depreciates over time, and 
because  permanent  labor income  grows,  the ratio of home value to per- 
manent  labor income  drifts down  over time.  When  this ratio drops  far 
enough,  the consumer  sells the existing home  and buys a new  one.  The 
most  important  twist in this model,  relative to the standard (S,s) model 
of durable goods,  is that the precise trigger point at which the consumer 
decides  to  buy  a new  house  depends  on  both  the  anticipated  risk of 
unemployment  and  the  size  of the  consumer's  current buffer stock  of 
liquid  assets.  This  is  illustrated  by  Figure  4,  which  shows  the  lower 
Figure  4 THE  JUMP  IN THE  LOWER  (S,s) TRIGGER 
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trigger point of the (S,s) rule as a function of the level of liquid assets the 
consumer  has,  for an employed  consumer  living  in an economy  in an 
expansion.27  The  curve  is  upward  sloping,  indicating  that  consumers 
with more liquid assets will buy a new durable earlier (or, more formally, 
at a higher trigger value).  Note that, in the presence  of aggregate shocks 
to transitory income,  this result could rationalize our empirical finding 
that  durables  and  home  sales  are high  in  periods  of  high  transitory 
income.  That is,  when  they  receive  windfall  income,  some  consumers 
are pushed  rightward  across the (S,s) barrier. This is an interesting  theo- 
retical  difference  with  the  CEQ  model  as  explored,  for  example,  by 
Bemanke  (1985), in which  transitory shocks  to income  should  have  es- 
sentially  no effect on durable-goods  spending.28 
The figure also shows  (the dashed  line) how  the trigger locus changes 
if the economy  enters a recession: for any given level of liquid assets,  the 
trigger  point  is  lower  (consumers  will  put  up  with  living  in  a poorer 
house  rather than buy).  That is, a consumer  who  had been on the brink 
of home  purchase  before  the  economy  entered  the recession  will  now 
wait until the house  has depreciated  more before buying.  Alternatively, 
a consumer with a given house value will require a larger stock of precau- 
tionary  liquid  assets  before  he  will  be willing  to buy. This shift in the 
lower (S,s) trigger is what we refer to in the title of the paper as "Jumping 
(S,s) Triggers." 
The  foregoing  story  is  somewhat  different  from  the  standard  (S,s) 
model's  explanation  of durables purchases over the business  cycle found 
in,  for  example,  Bar-Ilan and  Blinder  (1992),  Bertola  and  Caballero 
(1990), or Caplin and Leahy (1997).29  The main difference is the explicit 
importance  of  cyclical  variation  in  labor-income  uncertainty  in  our 
model:  in the standard model,  the sharp drop in durables purchases  in 
recessions  is triggered,  not by an increase  in uncertainty, but by a de- 
crease  in  the  level of expected  future  income  and  thus  of  "permanent 
income"  as  they  define  it.  The  empirical  distinction  between  the  two 
models  is thus that our model would  imply a strong effect of uncertainty 
27. We  also assume that the consumer  bought  his current  house with an 80%  mortgage  and 
expects to finance  the new house with an 80%  mortgage. 
28. One way to think about this finding is as an increase  in the marginal  propensity to 
consume durable  goods out of transitory  income. As a theoretical  matter,  this result 
corresponds  closely to Kimball's  (1990)  finding that precautionary  saving boosts the 
marginal  propensity  to consume nondurables  out of transitory  income. 
29. One interesting  recent paper that adopts a rather  different  approach  to these issues is 
Greenspan  and Cohen (1997),  who model vehicle sales as a function  of "scrappage" 
and who make a distinction between "engineering  scrappage"  and "cyclical  scrap- 
page." Roughly  speaking, however,  it is possible  to interpret  the effects  of the jumping 
(S,s) trigger in our model as corresponding  to the "cyclical  scrappage"  term in the 
Greenspan-Cohen  model. 194 *  CARROLL  & DUNN 
per se on  durables  purchases,  even  after controlling  for permanent  (or 
annuity)  income.  Another  way  to interpret the jump in the trigger is as 
reflecting  the  fact that an increase  in uncertainty  causes  an increase  in 
the marginal utility of liquid wealth,  because  its value  as a buffer stock 
against  uncertainty  rises.  This  is  in  explicit  contrast  with  Caplin  and 
Leahy's assumption  that the marginal utility of wealth is constant.30 
For purposes  of cyclical anlaysis,  the most important implication of the 
model  comes  from  the  interaction  of  the  precautionary  saving  motive 
and the jumping  (S,s) bands.  When the economy  switches  into a reces- 
sion,  a large proportion  of the entire set of consumers  who  had been on 
the  brink  of  home  purchase  suddenly  feel  that  their  current stock  of 
precautionary  saving,  which  had been  adequate  when  they anticipated 
continued  prosperity,  is  inadequate  in  the  new,  riskier environment. 
These  consumers  postpone  their home  purchases  until they have accu- 
mulated  enough  additional  precautionary savings  to again feel comfort- 
able with  the home  purchase  decision  (or until their home  has deterio- 
rated so much that they are willing  to risk buying a new  one even with a 
low buffer stock of liquid assets).31 
Another  interesting  feature  of  this  model  that is  not  present  in the 
standard  model  is that home  equity  serves  as an additional  reserve  of 
emergency  precautionary  resources  beyond  liquid  assets.  Consumers 
who  experience  a particularly vicious  series  of income  shocks  can,  in 
the  last  resort,  sell  their  houses  in  order to  tap  the  equity  to  finance 
current consumption.  Of course,  they  pay a heavy  price for this: They 
must  incur  brokerage  fees  and  pay  for  rented  housing  services  at  a 
price  substantially  higher  than  the  user  cost  of  ownership.  Still,  ex- 
treme  circumstances  call  for  extreme  measures.  This  feature  of  the 
model  is  interesting  because  several  papers  in the  empirical literature 
on precautionary  saving  have  found  larger effects of uncertainty on net 
worth  than on liquid  assets.  Carroll and Samwick (1997) speculate  that 
the  reason  may  be  precisely  this  potential  use  of  home  equity  as  a 
precautionary  reserve. 
30. One recent  paper  which focuses on the effects  of jumping  (S,s) triggers  is by Adda and 
Cooper (1997),  who examine the effects of two natural  experiments  thoughtfully  pro- 
vided to economists  by the French  government.  The experiments  involved subsidies  to 
automobile scrappage, which should have had the effect of moving the lower (S,s) 
trigger  up. Adda and Cooper  document  that the reaction  of automobile  sales to the tax 
subsidies was quite similar  to the predictions  of an (S,s) model when the lower trigger 
moves up. 
31. In the Greenspan-Cohen  model, the implication  would be that "cyclical  scrappage"  is 
strongly related to unemployment  expectations.  Although Greenspan  and Cohen do 
not report regressions of cyclical  scrappage  on unemployment  expectations,  they do 
report  that  cyclical  scrappage  falls  when the unemployment  rate  rises, which is roughly 
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Our  paper  is  not  the  first to  argue  that variations  in  the  degree  of 
uncertainty  are  important  in  explaining  durables  purchases  over  the 
business  cycle. As Berenke  (1983) pointed  out, and many authors have 
emphasized  since,  an increase  in uncertainty  increases  the option value 
of  waiting  until  the  uncertainty  is  resolved.32 A  formal illustration  of 
this can be seen  in Eberly (1997); she  shows  that in a model  with  only 
rate-of-return risk, when  the  degree  of rate-of-return risk goes  up  the 
(S,s) bands  widen,  provoking  a response  similar to that of the jump in 
the (S,s) band we  depict.  However,  the underlying  cause of the jump is 
rather different.  In Eberly's model  the  primary reason  for the  shift  in 
the  (S,s)  bands  is  that  if  the  bands  did  not  change,  an  increase  in 
uncertainty  would  increase  the  expected  present  discounted  value  of 
the adjustment  costs  the consumer  would  have  to pay. Thus the effect 
of  uncertainty  in  her  model  has  little  to  do  with  precautionary 
behavior-instead,  it mainly  reflects a change  in the trade-off between 
minimizing  average  fixed  costs  and  minimizing  average  distance  from 
the optimal housing  stock. Again,  a useful way to understand  the differ- 
ence  between  the  models  is to realize that the  main  effect  driving  the 
jump  in  the  (S,s)  trigger  in  our model  is  an  increase  in  the  marginal 
utility  of  liquid  assets-an  effect  that  is  absent  in  the  Bernanke  and 
Eberly models. 
An even  earlier analysis of many of these issues  can be found in three 
insightful  articles by Frederick Mishkin  (1976, 1977, 1978) which  antici- 
pate many  (though  not all) of the theoretical results that come from our 
formal optimizing  model.  In particular, Mishkin  (1978) argues  that "A 
consumer  suffering financial distress,  and unable to pay his bills readily, 
would  prefer holding  highly  liquid financial assets.  This implies  that as 
the consumer  perceives  an increasing probability of financial distress,  he 
will  decrease  his  demand  for  consumer  durables  and  limit  his  pur- 
chases."  Using  an  intuitive  but  ad  hoc  functional  form,  Mishkin  also 
documents  a strong  correlation between  durables  purchases  and  con- 
sumer sentiment,  and explicitly interprets consumer sentiment as a mea- 
sure of uncertainty. 
4.  Simulation  Results:  A Stylized  Business  Cycle 
Our simulation  results examine  the aggregate characteristics of an econ- 
omy populated  by 20,000 consumers  behaving  according to the optimal 
decision  rules  that  solve  the  maximization  problem  in  Section  3.  As 
preparation  for the  simulations,  we  start the model  economy  off at an 
32. For  a thorough  and recent  treatment,  see Dixit  and Pindyck  (1994). 196 - CARROLL & DUNN 
essentially  arbitrary point,  then  simulate  for 400 quarters of expansion, 
by which  time it has settled  into a stochastic  steady  state with a reason- 
ably stable distribution  of consumers  across the state space. 
The first experiment  we  perform is to examine  a recession  of typical 
length  (4 quarters) followed  by recovery  period of the same length.  We 
show  the path  of aggregate  variables from 8 quarters before the begin- 
ning  of the recession  to 4 quarters after the end of the recovery. Results 
are shown  in Figures 5 and 6; the contraction is shaded  dark gray, and 
the recovery period is shaded  light gray. In the first quarter of the reces- 
sion,  the unemployment  rate begins  moving  up as the new,  higher job 
loss risk affects its first batch of victims.  Recall, however,  that unemploy- 
ment  spells  in recessions  last 2 quarters: this means  that the new  reces- 
Figure 5 A TYPICAL RECESSION IN OUR SIMULATED ECONOMY 
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sionary  equilibrium  level  of the unemployment  rate is only  reached  in 
the second  quarter of recession.  Thereafter the unemployment  rate stays 
at the  same  high  level  throughout  the recession  and  recovery  periods, 
reverting  to its expansionary  level  only  in the  second  quarter after the 
end of the recovery  period. 
The adjacent chart shows  the expected  risk of job loss over the next 4 
quarters for a currently employed  consumer,  a statistic we take to be the 
closest  analogue  in our model  to the unemployment-expectations  vari- 
able used  in our empirical work.  Because it is an expectational  variable, 
when  the economy  enters  a recession  this measure  jumps  immediately 
to its recessionary  steady-state  value.  When the economy  moves  into the 
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know  that it is likely that the economy  will enter an expansionary  phase 
in the near future. 
Aggregate  income is given by simply summing  the actual current labor 
income  of all the  households  we  are simulating.  Movements  in aggre- 
gate income  can therefore be decomposed  into those  due to changes  in 
the level  of permanent  labor income and those  due to transitory shocks. 
The adjoining  figure shows  annuity income,  calculated as defined  in the 
empirical section  as the annuity value of the present discounted  value of 
future  labor  income.  We  calculate  aggregate  annuity  income  in  our 
model  from the combination  of the transition matrix for aggregate states 
and the transition matrices for employment  states during each aggregate 
state. In calculating annuity income we abstract from the long-term secu- 
lar growth  in income;  the results would  have been  essentially  the same 
had we  allowed  the drift term to enter. 
Nondurables  consumption,  which  is determined  (as always)  in large 
part by expectations,  drops immediately  and sharply when  the economy 
enters a recession.  Consumption  recovers somewhat  when  the economy 
enters  the  recovery  phase  and  further  when  the  economy  enters  the 
expansionary  phase.  The final figure  in the  set  shows  the behavior  of 
liquid  assets,  which  rise  sharply  during  the  recession  because  house- 
holds feel the need  to boost the level of their precautionary buffer stocks. 
Note  that the  precautionary  motive  is intense  enough  to outweigh  the 
dissaving  being  done  by the unemployed  consumers.  Savings  level  off 
during  the recovery  period and remain flat when  the expansion  begins. 
The next set of figures shows  the evolution  of the housing  market and 
household  balance  sheets.  In  the  first two  quarters of  the  recession, 
home  sales plummet  for the reasons  described  above: newly  wary con- 
sumers want a higher level of precautionary liquid assets before buying a 
house.  Note  the  impressive  magnitude  of  the  initial  decline  in  home 
sales: the  rate of sales  per capita falls by roughly  50%. After the initial 
collapse,  home  sales begin to rise again, then show  a minor surge when 
the  economy  enters  the  recovery  phase.  Finally, when  the  economy 
switches  into  expansion  there  is a massive  surge  of home  sales  as the 
consumers  who  had been  postponing  purchases  for precautionary  rea- 
sons  throw  caution to the wind. 
This last phenomenon,  the surge of sales when  the economy  exits the 
contraction,  has  a natural interpretation  as the release  of "pent-up  de- 
mand."  "Pent-up  demand"  is a phrase  used  loosely  by analysts  of the 
housing  and  auto  sectors  who  claim that recessions  are periods  when 
"pent-up  demand"  rises,  only  to  be  "released"  when  the  economy 
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ously  in  our  model  as  the  demand  which  would  be  immediately  be 
expressed  in  purchases  if  consumer  expectations  returned  to  normal 
levels.  In other words,  pent-up  demand  corresponds  to the set of con- 
sumers  populating  the region of the (S,s) diagram between  the jumping 
loci of the lower  (S,s) band.33 
It is worth  noting  just how  close  the correspondence  is between  this 
phenomenon  in the formal model and the informal descriptions of indus- 
try analysts  in both the housing  and the automotive  markets. For exam- 
ple,  a May  11,  1992 editorial  (p.  12) in Automotive News read,  in part: 
"[F]olks still aren't buying  cars ...  and I am convinced  that most Ameri- 
cans are still concerned  about their jobs. As long as that insecurity exists, 
we are going  to see a sluggish  auto industry." 
The graph to the right of the home-purchases  graph in Figure 6 shows 
the obvious  implication of purchases for the level of the housing  stock: at 
the  onset  of a recession,  the  growth  rate of the housing  stock deceler- 
ates.  Below  are the  growth  rate of debt and  the  time path of the  debt 
stock,  which  strongly  resemble  the patterns of home  purchases  and the 
housing  stock. 
The bottom two panels of Figure 6 show  the behavior of our measures 
of household  balance-sheet  conditions  over the business  cycle. Both the 
debt service burden and the ratio of debt to annuity income rise sharply 
at the beginning  of the recession,  in both cases because  the numerator 
is largely fixed by past decisions  while  the denominator  (income  or an- 
nuity income)  falls when  the economy  enters a recession.  Thereafter the 
debt service burden  drifts up until the economy  enters a full expansion- 
ary phase  again,  whereas  the ratio of debt to annuity  income  drops  as 
soon  as  the  economy  enters  the  recovery  period  (because  the  level  of 
annuity  income  jumps up; see the previous  set of figures). 
5.  Comparing  the  Model  with  U.S. Cyclical  Data 
We turn now  to some simulations  based on the pattern of expansion  and 
contraction  for  the  U.S.  economy  since  1961,  roughly  the  period  for 
which  we  were  able to perform our empirical work on U.S.  NIPA data. 
Again  we  start  the  economy  off  from  the  steady-state  equilibrium 
achieved  after 400 quarters of continuous  expansion,  but for quarters 401 
through  539 (corresponding  to 1962:2 through  1995:4) we  set the aggre- 
33. This definition  differs  somewhat from the definition  proposed  by Caballero  and Engel 
(1994).  They investigate a model with fixed (S,s) bands and describe  a period of high 
pent-up demand as a period  with a heavier  than usual concentration  of agents near  the 
(unmoving)  trigger  point. 200 * CARROLL & DUNN 
Figure 7 SIMULATED ECONOMY WITH ACTUAL RECESSION PTERN 
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gate state of the  simulated  economy  equal to the aggregate  state of the 
corresponding  quarter for the U.S.  economy  as indicated  by the offici 
NBER chronology.  (We arbitrarily assume  that  every  recession  is  fol- 
lowed  by a recovery period that is 4 quarters long, which is the expected 
0 .03  *  0.925 
duration  implied  by  the  transition  matrix.) Figures  7 and  8 shows  the 
results graphically. 
5.1 NONDUR  CON  PTIONRO 
We begin by examining  the analogue  to the Campbell-Mankiw  equation 
estimated  in the first part of the paper  The top panel  of Table 7 repro- 
duces  the  baseline  sentiment-augmented  Campbell-Mankiw  equation 
from Table 1. Row 1 in the second  panel of the table shows  that when  a 
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Figure 8 HOUSING,  DEBT, AND  BALANCE SHEETS 
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durables consumption  data from our model,  the forecastable component 
of income  growth  gets an insignificant  and negative  coefficient.3 
Row 2 shows  that consumption  growth  is not significantly  related to 
lagged  unemployment  expectations,  again in accord with  the CEQ PIH 
model  and  at  variance  with  the  empirical  results.  Finally, when  both 
predictable  income  growth  and lagged  unemployment  expectations  are 
included,  neither  is  significant  at  the  5% level.  Thus,  under  baseline 
parameter values  the model  does not reproduce the empirical results we 
found  when  estimating  the Campbell-Mankiw  model in Table 1. 
34. Under some alternative  assumptions on parameters,  the model does reproduce the 
Campbell-Mankiw finding  Given how long it takes to solve the model, we were 
unable to explore the parameter  space sufficiently  to determine  what kinds of parame- 
ter combinatons generate  the Campbell-Mankiw  result. 
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Table  7  THE  CAMPBELL-MANKIW  MODEL  ESTIMATED  ON 
SIMULATED  DATAa 
Balance 
Row/Measure  Et_- A log  Yt  UEt-1  sheet  SSR  D-W 
Empirical  results  (reproduced  from  Table  1) 
-0.906 
- (2.18)** 





















0.55  1.93 
0.55  1.81 
0.47  1.97 
0.42  1.98 
0.49  1.97 
0.47  1.97 
0.73  1.96 
0.67  1.93 
0.62  2.00 
aDependent  variable  is nondurable  consumption  growth. *, significant  at 10%  or better;  **,  at 5%  or 
better;  ***,  at 1%  or better. t-Statistics  are listed in parentheses  below coefficient  estimates. Yt  is total 
household wage and transfer  income.  UEt_  is the unemployment  expectations  index. The  instruments 
are the same as those used in Carroll,  Fuhrer,  and Wilcox  (1994).  The balance-sheet  variables  are the 
growth  in total household liabilities  (A log Dt_l), the debt service  burden  (rDt_l/Yt_1),  and the ratio  of 
total household liabilities  to annuity  income (Dt_l/At_1). A constant  term  was also included  but is not 
reported. 
0  0.269 
(1.64) 
Simulations  under  baseline  parameter  values 
1  0.032 
(0.19) 
2 
3  0.244 
(1.31) 









Simulations  after  financial  liberalization 
7  -0.127 
-(0.62) 
8 
9  0.135 
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The next regressions  examine the model's  predictions for the explana- 
tory power  of lagged balance-sheet  measures.  In accord with our empiri- 
cal  results,  none  of  the  balance-sheet  measures  has  any  explanatory 
power  for the growth  of nondurables  consumption. 
Table 8  examines  how  nondurables  consumption  in  our  model  re- 
sponds  to  innovations to  income  and  unemployment  expectations;  the 
corresponding  U.S.  empirical results from Table 2 are again reproduced 
in the top panel.  Recall that the CEQ PIH model  would  imply a coeffi- 
cient of 1 on A log At and zero on all other variables, while the Campbell- 
Mankiw model with A = 0.5 would  imply coefficients of 0.5 on both A log 
Yt and  A log  At, but  would  still imply  coefficients  of  zero  on  the  UE 
Table 8  EFFECT  OF INNOVATIONS  ON NONDURABLES 
CONSUMPTION  GROWTHa 
Row  A log Yt  A log A,  UE,_I  AUEt  R2  D-W 
Empirical  results (reproduced  from Table  2) 
0  0.324  0.124 
(3.15)***  (1.59) 
-1.003  -0.907 
-(2.93)***  -(1.52) 
Simulations  under baseline  parameters 
0.109  1.323  -3.398 
(1.51)  (22.41)***  - (2.41)** 
2  0.078 
(1.85)* 
-4.470  -5.561 
-(5.43)***  -(41.28)*** 
3  -0.006  0.486  -5.860  -4.050 
-(.021)  (12.08)***  -(10.07)***  -(25.94)*** 
0.95  1.86 
0.98  1.62 
Simulations  after  financial liberalization 
4  -0.032 
-(0.36) 
5  -0.054 
-(1.05) 
1.530  -4.394 
(21.85)***  -(2.67)*** 
-5.434  -63.926 
-(5.56)***  -(39.55)*** 
6  -0.186  0.596  -7.510  -46.023  0.98  1.57 
-(5.36)***  (13.75)***  -(11.59)***  -(27.59)*** 
aDependent  variable is simulated  nondurable  consumption  growth.  *, significant at 10% or better; **, at 
5% or better;  ***, at  1% or better.  t-Statistics  are listed  in  parentheses  below  coefficient  estimates. 
Standard  errors were  constructed  using  a serial-correlation-robust  covariance  matrix (allowing  serial 
correlation at lags up to 8). Yt is total household  wage  and transfer income.  At is annuity labor income. 
UE,t_  is the unemployment  expectations  index.  A constant  term was also included but is not reported. 
1 
0.34  1.92 
0.86  2.44 
0.86  2.50 
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variables. Row 3 in the second  panel shows  that under baseline parame- 
ter values our model implies a coefficient of about zero on A log Yt  and 0.5 
on A log At. However,  the major difference between  our model and either 
the  CEQ PIH model  or the  Campbell-Mankiw  model  is  our  model's 
implication  that both  the lagged  level  and the change  in UE should  be 
highly  statistically significant.35 This constitutes  at least a partial victory 
over  the  standard  models,  which  provide  no  role at all for unemploy- 
ment expectations  per  se. However,  it is fair to say that the model is at best 
a modest  success  in explaining  nondurables  data, since it does not repli- 
cate the basic Campbell-Mankiw  result. Furthermore, even for the unem- 
ployment  expectations  variable the  match  between  theory  and  data is 
imperfect: the theory implies that the contemporaneous  change in unem- 
ployment  expectations  should  be vastly more important than the lagged 
level,  but  the  empirical regressions  found  the  opposite  result.  Carroll, 
Fuhrer,  and  Wilcox  (1994) speculate  that  a model  which  incorporates 
both habit formation  and labor-income  uncertainty  might be able to ex- 
plain  the  importance  of  lagged  uncertainty  for  current  consumption 
growth; a recent paper by Overland  (1997) provides  a formal underpin- 
ning for this idea. Alternatively, it may take consumers  time to formulate 
new  spending  plans  upon  receipt  of  new  information;  this  could  be 
formalized in a model in which consumers draw up budgets only periodi- 
cally, and do not change  their spending  patterns until they find the time 
to draw up a new  budget. 
5.2 THE  CYCLICAL  DYNAMICS  OF DURABLES  SPENDING 
Table 9 presents  the  results  when  we  estimate  equations  for our simu- 
lated  home  sales  data  similar to those  estimated  earlier for both  NIPA 
durable goods  and total U.S. home sales; again the corresponding  empiri- 
cal result is reproduced  in the first row of the table.36 
In our  simulated  data  the  annuity-income  ratio is  insignificant,  but 
both the lagged  level  of unemployment  expectations  and the change  in 
unemployment  expectations  are highly  significant.  Here  the  level  and 
35. Because the variables are defined rather differently  and scaled quite differently,  it 
would not be appropriate  to compare  the coefficient  estimates  on UE from the model 
with those from the data;  hence we examine  only statistical  significance. 
36. Here we take the "corresponding"  result from the table on durable-goods  spending 
rather  than the table  on home sales. Although  we calibrate  our model to match  certain 
features of the housing market,  it is clear  that under alternative  parameter  values the 
model could equally be interpreted  as a model of purchases  of automobiles  or other 
durable  goods. Given the similarity  of the empirical  results  for  home sales and durable- 
goods sales documented in Tables  3 and 5, it is of little consequence whether we 
compare our model's predictions with the pattern of durable-goods  sales or home 
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Table  9  HOME  SALES  IN THE  SIMULATED  ECONOMYa 
Balance- 
Row/  sheet 
Measure  At_1/At  UEt_1  AUEt  Y/At  measure  R2  D-W 
Empirical  baseline  (reproduced  from  Table  5) 
0  -0.542  -7.471  -1.541  1.172  0.51  0.33 
-(3.48)*** -(4.21)***  -(0.70)  (2.99)*** 
Simulations  under  baseline  parameters 
1  0.037  -5.260  -19.407  -0.106  0.76  1.80 
(0.85)  -(8.07)*** -(10.55)*** -(2.57)*** 
2 A log Dt_1  0.048  -4.047  -20.452  -0.081  0.179  0.77  2.16 
(1.14)  -(5.50)*** -(11.31)*** -(1.98)**  (3.20)*** 
3 rDt-l/Yt1  0.043  -5.780  -19.641  -0.100  0.154  0.76  1.79 
(0.98)  -(7.63)*** -(10.66)*** -(2.41)**  (1.33) 
4 Dt_l/At_i  0.026  -4.875  -19.227  -0.096  -0.002  0.76  1.79 
(0.57)  -(5.49)*** -(10.31)*** -(2.16)**  -(0.64) 
Simulations  after  financial  liberalization 
5  -0.189  -7.020  -21.149  -0.296  0.80  1.93 
-(2.71)*** -(6.67)***  -(6.74)*** -(4.56)*** 
aDependent  variable  is the number  of home sales. *, significant  at 10%  or better;  **,  at 5%  or better;  ***, 
at 1%  or better. t-Statistics  are listed in parentheses  below coefficient  estimates.  A, is annuity labor 
income, and Yis total household wage and transfer  income. UEt_I is the unemployment  expectations 
index. The balance-sheet  variables  are the growth in total household liabilities  (A log D,_1),  the debt 
service  burden  (rDt_1/Yt_1),  and the ratio  of total  household  liabilities  to annuity  income  (Dt_l/A,_l).  A 
constant  term  was also included  but is not reported. 
the  change  in  the  level  of  the  unemployment  expectations  index  are 
roughly  equally statistically significant. 
Turning to the balance-sheet  variables, lagged  debt growth receives  a 
positive  and  significant  coefficient;  recall that it was  the  only  balance- 
sheet  variable that was  robustly  significant in the NIPA data. Although 
simultaneity  seemed  the most plausible  interpretation for the empirical 
results,  there  was  no  obvious  way  to  prove  that simultaneity  was  the 
correct interpretation.  Here the answer  is clear: simultaneity  is the cul- 
prit. Debt growth  is acting as a summary statistic for all of those  charac- 
teristics of the aggregate  environment  which  are important in determin- 
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aggregate  variables. For example,  during the course of recessions,  home 
sales  and  debt  growth  both plummet  initially, but recover substantially 
over  the  succeeding  few  quarters (even  while  the economy  remains  in 
recession).  The  partial recovery  in  sales  reflects  a combination  of  the 
buildup  of  consumers'  buffer  stocks  of  precautionary  savings  and  the 
continuing  depreciation  of  their  homes  [moving  some  of  them  across 
even  a lowered  (S,s) trigger]. These changing  circumstances are not cap- 
tured by  our observed  aggregate  variables,  but they  are at least partly 
captured by lagged  debt growth.  Hence  lagged  debt growth's  statistical 
significance  is entirely  attributable to the fact that it is an endogenous 
variable responding  to unobserved  but important  real determinants  of 
home  sales. 
The  remainder  of Table 9 shows  that the  other  two  lagged  balance- 
sheet variables are not systematically  related to home sales (as they were 
not in the empirical data). The reason can be seen  in Figure 8: the debt- 
to-income  ratio  and  the  debt  service  burden  tend  to  be  high  during 
recessions  because  income is temporarily low, but also tend to be high in 
recoveries  and  early  expansions,  because  upon  recovery  the  pent-up 
demand  built up  during  the recession  is satisfied  by a large number  of 
home  purchases  and a consequent  runup in aggregate debt. Hence both 
variables tend to be higher than average both during periods  of particu- 
larly low  sales  (recessions)  and particularly high  sales  (early recoveries 
and expansions). 
The fundamental  question  these  regressions  are designed  to address 
is whether  our model  performs better than the standard models  in ex- 
plaining  our empirical findings  in Tables 3,4 and 5. On the whole,  the 
answer  is yes.  Our model  implies  a very important role for unemploy- 
ment expectations  beyond  any correlation they may have with current or 
expected  future  levels  of income.  And  it provides  an interpretation  for 
the finding  that lagged  debt growth  is consistently  positively  related to 
current home  sales,  and that other balance-sheet  measures  are not con- 
sistently  related to home  sales.  However,  as in the nondurables  regres- 
sions,  the  model  implies  a  much  stronger  reaction  to  innovations  in 
uncertainty  than we observe empirically. We speculated  above that habit 
formation  might  explain  the  sluggishness  of nondurables  consumption 
with  respect  to  unemployment-expectations  innovations;  for  durable 
goods,  however,  time-to-build  or decision-lag  considerations  seem more 
plausible.  This is especially  so for housing  decisions;  a consumer  who 
has gone  to the trouble of househunting,  lining up financing,  negotiat- 
ing,  and bidding  on a house  is unlikely  to back out at the last moment 
because  of a sudden  change  in unemployment  expectations.  Similar but 
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5.3 THE  CYCLICAL  DYNAMICS  OF DEBT  GROWTH 
In the  model,  the  primary determinant  of debt  growth  is home  sales. 
Indeed,  since all debt is used for home purchases,  and since the value of 
all homes  purchased  is in exactly the same proportion to the permanent 
labor income  of the buyer, one  might  think that the model  implies  that 
data on home  sales should  explain 100%  of the variation on debt growth. 
A glance at Figure 6 will confirm that the patterns of some sales and debt 
growth over the cycle are indeed  quite similar. However,  the model does 
provide  several channels  through which other variables influence  aggre- 
gate debt growth.  First, a small number of consumers  who  have experi- 
enced  a particularly nasty  series of shocks find themselves  forced to sell 
their homes  and rent temporarily in order to get access to the emergency 
reserve  of  precautionary  resources  represented  by  their home  equity. 
Second,  among  the consumers  who  are currently renting,  fewer will be 
willing  to buy new  homes  when  unemployment  expectations  are pessi- 
mistic.  The number  of consumers  who  are forced to sell and rent will 
obviously  be  on  average  related to the level  and change  of unemploy- 
ment  expectations.  Finally, note  that-because  the  (S,s) trigger jumps 
around-even  though  every  purchase  represents  exactly  the  same 
amount  of  debt  acquisition  (relative  to  the  permanent  income  of  the 
buyer),  every  sale  does  not  reflect  the  same  amount  of  debt  retired. 
Hence  we  should  expect variables that affect the location (S,s) trigger to 
have an effect on debt growth. 
Table 10 presents  the  results  when  we  estimate  regressions  for debt 
growth  like those  estimated  in Table 6 above. As expected  (and as in the 
empirical data), debt growth is very closely related to home  sales; when 
the pace of home  sales is the only regressor, the R2  is 0.76. However,  the 
next regression  shows  that the lagged level of the unemployment  expec- 
tations index does provide additional explanatory power for debt growth 
(again corresponding  to the empirical result). When we add the growth 
rate  of  annuity  income  to  this  baseline  regression,  the  innovation  to 
annuity income is not statistically significant, in contrast with the empiri- 
cal regressions.  In contrast  to  the  results  for durable  and  nondurable 
goods,  the change  in unemployment  expectations  is not statistically sig- 
nificant.  Finally, we  consider  the lagged  balance-sheet  measures,  all of 
which  are negatively  correlated with current debt growth.  These results 
contrast with  the empirical regressions,  in which  the lagged  dependent 
variable received  a strongly  positive  coefficient  and  the  other balance- 
sheet  measures  were insignificant. 
In sum,  the model captures (almost by assumption)  the strong empiri- 
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Table  10  DEBT  GROWTH  AND ITS  CORRELATESa 
Balance- 
Rowl  sheet 
Measure  Ht  UEt_1  AUEt  A log At  measure  R2  D-W 
Empirical  baseline  (reproduced  from  table  6) 
0  0.130  -2.867  -1.662  0.059  2.12 
(5.90)*** -(6.41)***  -(2.42)**  -(0.79) 
Simulations  under  baseline  parameters 
1  0.826  0.76  2.07 
(20.95)*** 
2  0.812  -1.419  0.77  2.22 
(20.88)***  -(2.81)*** 
3  0.805  -1.465  -0.203  0.77  2.22 
(10.36)***  -(2.24)***  -(0.11) 
4  0.791  -1.564  0.017  0.77  2.23 
(13.54)***  -(2.67)***  (0.49) 
5  0.806  -1.477  0.726  0.026  0.77  2.24 
(10.34)***  -(2.25)**  (0.30)  (0.56) 
6 A log Dt_1  0.826  -2.324  -0.126  0.78  1.94 
(21.43)***  -(3.79)***  -(2.51)*** 
7 rDt_/Yt_1  0.825  -0.673  -0.223  0.78  2.20 
(21.25)*** -(1.11)  -(2.17)*** 
8 Dt_/At_l  0.811  -0.916  -0.003  0.77  2.21 
(20.88)*** -(1.41)  -(1.23) 
aDependent  variable  is the growth in total  household  liabilities:  simulated  data. *, significant  at 10%  or 
better;  **, at 5% or better;  ***,  at 1%  or better. t-Statistics  are listed in parentheses  below coefficient 
estimates.  His home sales per capita.  UEt_1  is the unemployment  expectations  index. The  balance-sheet 
variables  are the lagged dependent variable  (A log Dt_l), the debt service  burden (rDt_l/Yt_l),  and the 
ratio  of total  household  liabilities  to annuity  income  (Dt_  /At_ ). A constant  term  was also included  but is 
not reported. 
with  a CEQ PIH model  or a standard  (S,s) model,  it also  provides  an 
interpretation for the empirical finding that unemployment  expectations 
are significantly  related to debt growth.  It does not, however,  imply the 
observed  empirical positive  autocorrelation in debt growth  after unem- 
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5.4 SUMMARY 
The  analysis  of  this  section  has  attempted  to  determine  whether  our 
model does a better job than standard models of explaining the empirical 
regularities  relating  nondurable  consumption  growth,  durables  pur- 
chases,  balance-sheet  variables,  and  unemployment  expectations.  The 
model is successful  in that it implies an important role for unemployment 
expectations  in addition to the expected level of future income. However, 
it also suggests  that there is a paradox about the role of unemployment 
expectations: while the model implies that consumption  growth, durables 
purchases,  and debt acquisition should be strongly affected by changes in 
unemployment  expectations,  our empirical work found  that the lagged 
level of expectations  was always  much more statistically important than 
the change  in expectations. 
6.  Was  the  1990  Recession  "Special"? 
To this point in the paper we have not directly addressed  the question  of 
whether  the  1990 recession  was  "special" in  any  sense,  although  we 
motivated  the paper by noting  that common  analyses  of the 1990 reces- 
sion attributed the unusual  consumption  weakness  to "household  debt 
overhang."  In  this  section  we  examine  first the  theory  and  then  the 
evidence. 
6.1 THEORY 
6.1.1  The Dynamic Response to  Deregulation  As  briefly  noted  earlier, 
prior to the  1990 recession  there was a rapid and considerable  runup in 
the ratio of household  debt to income  (see Figure 1). The most plausible 
explanation is that this was the consequence  of the wide-ranging  deregu- 
lation  of  financial  markets  that  took  place  in  the  late  1970s and  early 
1980s. 
Capturing  the  full  complexity  of  financial  deregulation  is  obviously 
beyond  the scope  of the model introduced  above.  However,  both before 
and after deregulation,  home mortgage borrowing was by far the largest 
component  of total household  debt. To the extent that the main effect of 
deregulation  was  to  make  mortgage  borrowing  easier by  reducing  re- 
quired  down  payments,  our model  can be  used  to  get  a sense  of  the 
likely effects of deregulation.  The particular experiment we consider is a 
one-time  reduction  in  the  down-payment  requirement  from  our  20% 
baseline  assumption  to 10%. Of course,  the progress of credit liberaliza- 
tion  was  in reality much  more  gradual,  but  this experiment  should  at 
least  give  a sense  of the  likely results  of a more gradual deregulation. 210 *  CARROLL  & DUNN 
Figure  9 DYNAMIC  PATH  OF ECONOMY  AFTER 
FINANCIAL  LIBERALIZATION 
Housing  Stock Permanent  Income  Debt Permanent  Income 
9.6  8.00 




8.8  *  V  ~77.25 
8.6  7.00 
8.4  6.75 
1  100  200  1  100  200 
Liquid  Assets Permanent  Income  Saving Rate 





0.74  0.02  / 
0.72 
0.70  0.01  - 
0.68 
1  100  200  1  100  200 
In the short term, the effects of deregulation  are very similar to those 
of moving  from a recession  to an expansion:  the bottom of the (S,s) band 
jumps  upward  instantly.  Figure. 9 depicts  the  results  of  reducing  the 
down-payment  requirement for an economy  which had previously  been 
in stochastic  steady-state  equilibrium. The immediate  effect of deregula- 
tion is to spur an avalanche  of home  sales,  which  is accompanied  by a 
massive  runup  in debt and consequently  a large increase in the aggre- 
gate debt-to-income  ratio. Eventually the level of housing  per capita falls 
most  of the way  (although  not  all the way)  back to its original steady- 
state  level,  but  the  ratio of  debt  to  income  plateaus  at a substantially 
higher  level.  The  level  of  liquid  assets  immediately  drops  sharply,  as 
most  of the  consumers  who  had been  saving  up  for a down  payment 
now  find that, in combination  with the equity from their previous home, 
their  current  stock  of  liquid  assets  is  enough  to  cover  the  new  lower 
down-payment  requirement.  The  level  of  liquid  assets  gradually  re- 
bounds  a bit as new  homeowners  struggle to build up their buffer stocks 
of liquid assets to the target level, but the new steady-state level of liquid 
assets  is  well  below  its  pre-deregulation  equilibrium.  This reflects  the 
fact that a substantial  part of the  average  stock of liquid  assets  repre- 
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consequences  of deregulation  for the aggregate  saving  rate are particu- 
larly interesting: in the three or four years after deregulation it drops from 
about 234%  to under  1%, but eventually  recovers a bit to settle down  at 
slightly less than 2%. The U shape in the saving rate reflects the fact that 
for quite a while after deregulation  most of the housing  stock still consists 
of homes bought in the pre-deregulation  period when the down-payment 
requirement was higher. These homeowners  on average need to do very 
little down-payment  saving,  because  the comparatively  large equity  in 
their previous  home is by itself almost enough  for the down payment  on 
the  new  home.  Eventually,  however,  the  entire housing  stock is com- 
posed  of homes  bought  after liberalization and consumers  have to boost 
their saving  somewhat  in  order to accumulate  down  payments  again. 
6.1.2  Cyclical  Properties  of the Deregulated  Economy  From the standpoint 
of cyclical analysis,  perhaps  the most  interesting  question  to ask about 
the deregulated  economy  is whether  the higher prevailing debt burdens 
make  aggregate  consumption  more  volatile  and  in particular more  re- 
sponsive  to  unemployment  expectations.  We address  this  question  by 
repeating  the  simulation  and  regression  analysis  of Section  5 for a de- 
regulated  economy  that is otherwise  identical to our baseline  economy. 
The bottom panels of Tables 7 and 8 present the results for the nondura- 
bles regressions  in the deregulated economy. Results are on the whole not 
much different: both forecastable income growth and lagged unemploy- 
ment  expectations  remain  statistically  insignificant,  as do  the  balance- 
sheet variables (not reported). Nondurables  consumption  does react a bit 
more strongly to a change in unemployment  expectations,  but the change 
is modest. 
The  bottom  panel  of  Table 9,  however,  shows  that  home  sales  are 
more  sensitive  to  unemployment  expectations  in  the  high-debt  econ- 
omy: the coefficient  on the lagged  level  of unemployment  expectations 
changes  from about -5  to about -7,  and the coefficient on the change in 
unemployment  expectations  increases  from about  -19  to about  -21.37 
Meanwhile,  the  annuity-income  ratio  (which  was  insignificant  in  the 
baseline  economy)  becomes  statistically significant. 
There are several reasons why  home  sales are more sensitive  to uncer- 
tainty in the liberalized economy. The most important is probably simply 
that buying  a house  is a considerably  riskier financial venture,  for two 
reasons.  First, and most important, there is a great deal less home equity 
available as an emergency  reserve against major disasters (a long unem- 
37. This increase  in  the  significance  of UE is the  smallest  increase  we  found  under  any 
combination  of parameter  values  we  checked.  In the original draft of the  paper,  the 
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ployment  spell  or a substantial  reduction  in the level  of permanent  in- 
come).  Second is a mechanism  emphasized  by Fratantoni (1996): Because 
mortgage payments  cannot be altered once the mortgage is taken out, all 
adjustment  of consumption  to any income shocks must be borne entirely 
by nondurables  consumption.  The larger mortgage  payment  associated 
with  a lower  down  payment  thus  implies  that at any given  amount  of 
liquid wealth,  any given amount of uncertainty will have a greater influ- 
ence on nondurables  consumption. 
One  way  to think  about these  results  is to consider  the large down- 
payment  requirement  as a form of forced saving which,  essentially  as a 
side effect,  also serves  a precautionary role. When the amount of forced 
saving  declines,  consumers  must  partially replace the effective  precau- 
tionary  buffer  that  the  forced  saving  provided  by  reacting  more  with 
their discretionary  precautionary behavior. 
These  results  supply  a potential  theoretical underpinning  for the idea 
that  the  runup  in  consumer  debt  in  the  late  1980s was  at least  partly 
responsible  for the severity of the decline in consumer spending,  particu- 
larly on durable goods,  in the recession and subsequent  slow recovery in 
the early 1990s. However,  the rise in debt-to-income  ratios is not, in this 
interpretation,  the driving force in the story; rather, both the increase in 
debt  and  an  increased  sensitivity  of  durables  spending  to  unemploy- 
ment expectations  are emergent  properties of the new stochastic equilib- 
rium with  deregulated  credit markets. 
It if worth  emphasizing  here how  surprising this theoretical result is. 
The usual  economic  intuition  is  that relaxation of liquidity  constraints 
should  allow  consumers  to smooth  consumption  more.  Here,  a relaxa- 
tion in liquidity constraints  has exactly the opposite  effect. 
6.2 EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE 
We turn,  finally, to the question  of whether  there is any empirical evi- 
dence  for  the  proposition  that  in  the  wake  of  financial  deregulation 
durables spending  has become more sensitive to unemployment  expecta- 
tions.  We first perform the simplest  possible  test by examining  whether 
the  coefficient  on  the  unemployment  expectations  variables  has  been 
significantly  higher  in  the  post-deregulation  period  than  in  the  pre- 
deregulation  period.  The principal difficulty in performing this test is in 
deciding  from when  to date  the  deregulation.  The initial stages  of de- 
regulation  took place in the late 1970s during the Carter administration, 
and  the policy  reforms were  largely complete  by 1983. However,  argu- 
ably the most important development  (at least from the standpoint  of its 
effect on the availability of mortgage credit) in the liberalized market was 
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Table 11  INTERACTION TERM IN DURABLES REGRESSIONa 
Row  UEt  UEfPost5  AUEt  AUEPost85  R2  D-W 
1  -2.320  0.723  0.43  0.54 
-(6.19)***  (1.06) 
2  -2.032  -2.144  0.385  0.46  0.55 
-(6.39)***  -(2.60)***  (0.66) 
3  -2.341  0.486  1.322  0.43  0.54 
-(6.28)***  (0.71)  (0.85) 
4  -2.051  -2.076  0.283  0.626  0.46  0.56 
-(6.43)***  -(2.34)**  (0.42)  (0.38) 
aDependent  variable  is the ratio of durables  consumption  to annuity labor  income, 1963:2-1994:3.  *, 
significant  at 10%  or better;  **,  at 5%  or better;  ***at  1%  or better.  t-Statistics  are listed in parentheses 
below coefficient  estimates. Standard  errors  were constructed  using a serial-correlation-robust  covari- 
ance matrix  (allowing  serial  correlation  at lags up to 18).  UEt_- is the unemployment  expectations  index, 
and UE,Ss  is the index times a dummy variable  equal to one from 1985:1  to the end of the sample 
period. The following  were also included  as independent  variables  but not reported:  a constant  term, 
the ratio  of lagged annuity  income  to current  annuity  income  (At_l/At),  the prime  rate  (PrimeS),  current 
income over annuity income (Y/At), and household net worth (NWJ/A).  A constant term was also 
incuded but is not reported. 
the  Federal  National  Mortgage  Association  and  similar  government- 
sponsored  enterprises.  The associated  rapid growth  in mortgage  debt 
appears to have begun around 1985. We therefore date the postliberaliza- 
tion period  as beginning  in 1985 (although  our empirical results are not 
sensitive  to the exact dates we choose). 
Results are presented  in Table 11. The interaction term on the level of 
unemployment  expectations  is  highly  statistically  significant,  and  im- 
plies  that  the  coefficient  on  unemployment  expectations  was  roughly 
twice  as large in the postliberalization  period as in the earlier period.38 
However,  the coefficient  on the interaction term is insignificant  for the 
variable  measuring  the  change  in  unemployment  expectations,  once 
again reflecting  our general empirical finding  that the change  in unem- 
ployment  expectations  is not nearly as reliably important as the level in 
influencing  consumption  choices. 
7. Conclusions 
The broad  goal  of  this  paper  has  been  to document  and  then  explain 
the relationships  between  household  balance sheets  and consumer  pur- 
38. We  found  similar  results  when  we  allowed  all regression  coefficients  (not  just  the 
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chase  decisions.  In our empirical  work  we  found  that unemployment 
expectations  appear  to  have  an  influence  on  spending  decisions  be- 
yond  any information  those  expectations  contain about future levels  of 
income.  We therefore  develop  a theoretical model  of debt-financed  du- 
rables purchases  which  has a serious  role for labor-income  uncertainty. 
This model  implies  that the location  of the lower  (S,s) trigger depends 
on  the  degree  of  labor-income  uncertainty;  when  uncertainty  in- 
creases,  consumers  postpone  durables  purchases  until  their  balance- 
sheet  condition  improves.  We find  that this model  does  a much better 
job  than  the  standard  certainty-equivalent  or fixed-band  (S,s)  models 
at  explaining  the  cyclical  dynamics  of  spending  and  balance  sheets. 
However,  the  model  does  highlight  a paradox: It is the lagged  level  of 
unemployment  expectations,  rather  than  the  change  in  expectations 
(which  the  model  emphasizes),  that appears  to be related to spending 
decisions. 
This paper suggests  a variety of important directions for future work. 
First, the calibration of the model  was  necessarily  ad hoc.  There appear 
to be surprisingly  few  data available about such important questions  as 
how  the risk of job loss changes  over the business  cycle, or how  the job- 
finding hazard changes  for those who are unemployed.  Given the appar- 
ent  empirical  and  theoretical  importance  of  labor income  uncertainty, 
this  is  an  area  where  very  useful  work  could  be  done.  Second,  the 
analysis of this paper treated unemployment  expectations  and the aggre- 
gate economic  state as exogenous.  Although  in the wake of the rational- 
expectations  revolution  in macroeconomics  it sounds  staggering  to say 
it, to our knowledge  there has been virtually no recent research on how 
consumers'  observable expectations  are determined,  either for the unem- 
ployment  expectations  variable we consider or for any of the other aggre- 
gate  measures  of  consumer  expectations.  There are presumably  many 
tests  that could be performed  to determine,  for example,  the rationality 
of those  expectations.  Fourth, the extreme short-term response  of dura- 
bles  spending  to  uncertainty  clearly  raises  the  possibility  of  multiple 
equilibria in a general equilibrium version  of this model.  Although  solv- 
ing the full model  in a general equilibrium setting is clearly well beyond 
current  computational  capacities,  it is  possible  that  simplified  models 
which  build  in  an  extreme  sensitivity  of  durables  spending  to  uncer- 
tainty might  be solvable.  Finally, the model  has many implications  that 
are testable  with  microeconomic  data.  For example,  a straightforward 
test would  be to estimate a probit model of home purchase decisions  and 
to test whether  the purchase  decision  is affected by either local or aggre- 
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I am  very  much  a fan  of  the  line  of  work  that Chris Carroll and  his 
collaborators have been  exploring in recent years.  Precautionary saving 
is different  from and  much  more interesting  than we  used  to think.  It 
can account  for a range  of interesting  phenomena  that are hard to ex- 
plain  within  the  standard  certainty-equivalence  version  of life-cycle  or 
permanent-income  theory. In particular, precautionary behavior changes 
the role of assets,  so that it makes sense  to look to precautionary motives 
for  a  coherent  account  of  the  Greenspan  hypothesis  that  the  debt 
buildup  in  the  1980s contributed  to the  recession  of the  early 1990s.  I 
think that the  study  has a good  deal to it, and I am sympathetic  to the 
general thrust of the paper. I like the emphasis  on durable goods  as well 
as on nondurables  and assets,  and I like and find plausible the proposi- 
tion  that  financial  deregulation  has  increased  the  vulnerability  of  the 
economy  by making  consumption  more responsive  to shocks.  But this 
paper  documents  these  general  points  in  what  seems  to  me  a rather 
strange  way,  looking  at some  stylized  facts while  ignoring  others,  and 
constructing  a  model  of  housing  that-while  interesting  in  its  own 
right-is  of  unproven  relevance  for  the  important  hypothesis  with 
which  the  paper begins;  namely,  that "deteriorated balance sheets"  in- 
crease the propensity  of the economy  to fall into recession. 
The  paper  begins  with  some  regressions,  based  on  various  exten- 
sions  of Campbell and Mankiw's  (1989) consumption-growth  equations. 
Nondurable  consumption  growth  depends  on the one-period-ahead  an- 
ticipated rate of growth of income and on lagged unemployment  expecta- 
tions  (more or less  as in Carroll, Fuhrer, and Wilcox, 1994, although  the 
variable used there was consumer sentiment).  Various balance-sheet mea- 
sures add little or nothing  significant to these  equations.  Similar regres- 
sions are run for the ratio of consumption  of durables to annuity income, 
for total home  sales,  and  for the  growth  in  total household  liabilities. 
Temporarily putting  these  results  to one  side,  Carroll and  Dunn  then 
develop  an  intertemporal  choice  model  with  two  goods:  nondurables 
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and  housing  services.  Consumers  can  own  or rent  houses  (at a pre- 
mium); buyers  are constrained  to purchase houses  whose  value is three 
times their income,  and must meet a down-payment  constraint and pay 
transaction  costs.  Marginal utility is strictly convex,  consumers  experi- 
ence  spells  of unemployment,  and  (the macroeconomic  component)  of 
income growth  follows  a serially correlated process that mimics the busi- 
ness  cycle.  The policy  functions  are solved  out,  and  macro results  ob- 
tained  by  aggregating  simulations  for 20,000  consumers.  The  data  so 
produced  are then subjected to the same battery of extended  Campbell- 
Mankiw  tests  which  began  the  paper,  and  the  results  compared.  The 
model  scores a few points,  but by and large, the match is unimpressive. 
Indeed,  several of the most important stylized facts are missed,  including 
the correlations  between  consumption  growth  and both predictable in- 
come growth  and lagged  unemployment  expectations. 
Apart  from  the  substantive  results-to  which  I will  return below- 
I  have  several  concerns  about  this  methodology.  First,  although  the 
Campbell-Mankiw  results provide a useful set of stylized facts that com- 
peting  models  should  be  able  to  explain,  it is  unclear  why  matching 
those  results  is an adequate  substitute  for fitting the model  to the data. 
Carroll and Dunn's  methodology  picks a few correlations that have to be 
fitted  and  ignores  all the  others.  For example,  there  is  no  attempt  to 
check whether  the time-series patterns of the simulations bear any resem- 
blance  to those  in  the  data,  although  at least  some  of the  tables  (e.g., 
Table 9) suggest  that they  do  not.  Such a narrowly  focused  estimation 
strategy  provides  neither  an adequate  test  of the  model  nor adequate 
recognition  of  what  it can explain,  even  when  it uniquely  does  so.  A 
more  thorough  estimation  and  testing  procedure  might  even  provide 
positive  evidence  to offset the model's  obvious  deficiencies. 
My second  concern is a more general one and concerns how  this sort 
of work  should  be reported.  It is very hard to find out exactly what  the 
authors  did,  even  on  a careful  reading.  The  calculation  of  the  policy 
function  requires four days on a Unix workstation,  and those  of us who 
have  performed  similar  (albeit much  simpler)  calculations  know  how 
hard it is to persuade  oneself-let  alone  anyone  else-that  the calcula- 
tions  have  been  correctly  performed.  Matters  are  at  their  worst-as 
here-when  there  are no  analytical  results  against  which  the  calcula- 
tions  can be checked.  Not  only  that, but there are no results  here that 
guarantee  the  existence  of  policy  functions  or  (conditional  on  policy 
functions)  the existence  of an invariant distribution or convergence  to it. 
Models  of precautionary  saving  are delicate,  and we  know  from special 
cases of Carroll and Dunn's  model  that the existence  of a limiting distri- 
bution  depends  on the values  of the parameters. The complexity  of the Comment  ?219 
calculations also precludes  any serious attempt to choose  the parameters 
so as to fit the data best.  Hence,  even  if we  stipulate  the correctness of 
the calculations,  we have no way of knowing  whether  the poor fit of the 
model  comes  from an unfortunate  calibration, or rather is fundamental 
to the model's  structure. The authors are really groping in the dark, and 
they expect a great deal of their audience when  they ask us to accept that 
what they have here is what they say they have found.  Of course,  these 
problems  are common  to a great deal of applied work that roots itself in 
dynamic  programming.  But if the  profession  does  not  find  a way  of 
making  these  calculations  credible  and  reproducible,  their  usefulness 
remains in serious  doubt. 
Nevertheless,  I think the general approach is correct, and that precau- 
tionary  motives  can help  explain  the role of balance-sheet  variables in 
affecting the rate of growth  of consumption.  Indeed,  the sort of effects I 
have  in mind  have  been  previously  emphasized  in Carroll (1997), who 
showed  that,  in  his  buffer-stock  model  of  precautionary  saving,  the 
conditional  variance  of consumption  is inversely  related to the level  of 
assets.  When  the  buffer  stock is low,  negative  shocks  to earnings  and 
returns  have  larger consequences,  the  growth  rate of  consumption  is 
expected  to  be  more  variable,  and  current consumption  is restrained. 
More formally, the  same  result holds  in the no-borrowing  buffer-stock 
model  developed  in  my  own  work  (Deaton,  1991).  In  Deaton  and 
Laroque (1992), we  show  that, with no borrowing allowed-in  Carroll's 
model,  there  is  voluntary  abstention  from borrowing,  with  much  the 
same  consequences-if  (1) instantaneous  marginal utility  is convex  in 
consumption,  (2) the rate of interest is lower than the rate of time prefer- 
ence,  and (3) earnings  are i.i.d.,  then,  conditional  on information avail- 
able at time  t  -  1, the  variance  of the  value  of the  marginal utility  of 
consumption  at t is monotone  nonincreasing  in the level of assets.  Pro- 
vided  that marginal utility is not too convex,  the one-period-ahead  vari- 
ance of consumption  will behave in the same way. In this case, assets are 
a precautionary  buffer that ensures  consumption  ex ante. When precau- 
tionary stocks are low, consumers  are vulnerable,  for example  to unem- 
ployment  shocks,  and an unanticipated  negative shock will have a larger 
negative  impact  on  consumption-and  on  the  economy-than  would 
have  been  the  case  had  consumers  been  better cushioned  with  more 
assets.  Consumption  is rendered  more sensitive  to adverse  shocks by a 
runup of debt, even  one that was warranted on previous  information.  If 
regulation prevents  consumers  from assuming  at least some of this debt, 
or makes  them  hold  more  assets  than they  wish,  deregulation  will in- 
crease the vulnerability  of consumption. 
Another  version  of much  the  same  story can be tied to housing,  al- 220  GILCHRIST 
though  through  a different  route from that developed  in the paper. As 
has been  emphasized  by Modigliani  in the context  of life-cycle  saving, 
precautionary  motives  may  not  be  very  important  if  wealth  is  being 
accumulated  for other purposes.  Modigliani argues that retirement bal- 
ances  can do double  duty as precautionary balances,  so that there is no 
separate role for precautionary saving; a corollary is that the replacement 
of  life-cycle  wealth  with  social  security-which  cannot  be  used  as 
collateral-will  make precautionary  motives  more important.  Although 
I would  argue  that the  importance  of life-cycle  saving  is overstated  in 
such arguments,  the argument  can be applied to housing.  To the extent 
that deregulation  has made it easier for people  to buy houses,  for exam- 
ple by lowering  down-payment  ratios,  or raising the ratio of mortgage 
debt  to income,  there  will  be  less  saving  up  to buy  a house,  and  less 
ability to go further into debt to deal with a bad shock.  People will hold 
fewer assets (or more debt), and they will be made better off by not being 
forced to hold  assets  that they  do not want,  but their consumption  will 
be more variable and more vulnerable  to negative  shocks. 
Theoretical results of this sort make precautionary saving and deregu- 
lation  plausible  candidates  for explaining  the  increased  sensitivity  of 
consumption  to  bad  news.  Of  course,  we  are  still  a  long  way  from 
having  a precise  and  empirically  supported  account  of  such  a mecha- 
nism.  Carroll and  Dunn's  paper  is a useful  first step  in this direction. 
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posed  explanation  is that this weakness  resulted from households'  reluc- 
tance to take on more debt in the face of increased uncertainty regarding 
future employment  prospects.  The idea here is that the last recession was 
unusual in the sense that it was the first recession (and hence first substan- 
tial increase  in unemployment  risk) to have  occurred after the financial 
deregulation  of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the associated  rise in 
debt during most of the 1980s. More generally, the paper provides a model 
of consumer behavior that links unemployment  risk, durable and nondu- 
rable spending,  and household  balance sheets.  The goal is to match some 
of the observed  stylized facts regarding these variables, and to explore the 
implications  of financial deregulation  in the context of such a model. 
Appropriately  enough,  the paper starts by documenting  the stylized 
facts. The paper goes  about documenting  these facts using  standard off- 
the-shelf  regressions  for nondurable  and durable consumption  expendi- 
tures.  The  paper  also  considers  similar  regressions  for  housing.  The 
nondurables  regression is of the Campbell-Mankiw  variety, i.e.,  a regres- 
sion of consumption  growth  on income  growth and other variables that 
may  matter in  a world  where  the  permanent-income  hypothesis  does 
not hold.  The authors  consider  two  types  of variables as candidates  by 
which  to augment  such  regressions:  consumer  balance-sheet  measures 
such as debt growth  or debt service,  and a consumer  sentiment  variable 
which  measures  consumers'  expectations  regarding the unemployment 
rate. The nondurable  regressions  are fairly persuasive  in their findings: 
there appears to be no systematic  relationship between  nondurable con- 
sumption  growth  and balance-sheet  variables, with  the possible  excep- 
tion  of debt  growth,  once  one  includes  unemployment  expectations  in 
the  regression.  On  the  other  hand,  unemployment  expectations  have 
substantial  predictive  power  for nondurables.  The empirical analysis  is 
thorough  and persuasive  with respect to this conclusion. 
The durables regression  relates consumer  durable expenditures  to an- 
nuity  income  growth  and  unemployment  expectations.  The  baseline 
model  is  a  variant  of  the  Mankiw  specification  of  consumer  durable 
expenditures  under  the assumption  of no significant transactions costs, 
adjustment  costs,  or other frictions. Again, this model finds a significant 
role for unemployment  expectations.  The paper also  finds  that lagged 
balance-sheet  measures  are positively  correlated with durables expendi- 
tures,  suggesting,  unsurprisingly,  an  endogeneity  regarding  durables 
expenditures  and debt. 
While the paper is thorough  in this analysis,  it is not clear that these 
regressions  are the  most  useful  facts to document  when  matching  the 
model  to the data. The nondurables  regressions  are informative for com- 
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one  would  want  to  match  in  a calibration exercise,  particularly since 
there is no  obvious  link between  the unemployment  expectations  mea- 
sure collected  by the University  of Michigan and the uncertainty fed into 
the  numerical  model.  From the  perspective  of durable-goods  expendi- 
tures  the  focus  on  such  regressions  is  more  puzzling,  given  that  the 
authors  have  in mind  an  (S,s) model  of durables,  which  would  not  fit 
such  regressions  even  if  permanent-income  behavior  held.  Perhaps 
more  useful  here  would  be  to  focus  on  simple  correlations  between 
variables  rather than  the more complicated  regressions  included  in the 
paper. 1 
Although  the  empirical  work  takes  up  a  substantial  portion  of  the 
paper,  the  modeling  section  is where  the innovations  in the  paper lie. 
The  authors  present  a model  of  consumer  behavior  that  incorporates 
nondurables  and  housing.  The  key  elements  to  the  model  are lumpy 
housing  and significant  transaction costs  to buying  and selling  houses. 
In addition,  consumers  face a substantial  degree  of idiosyncratic  uncer- 
tainty  through  the  process  of  unemployment.  Capital markets  are as- 
sumed  to be imperfect  in two important ways.  First, there are no insur- 
ance  markets  which  would  allow  consumers  to diversify  idiosyncratic 
risk, and second,  there is a down-payment  requirement of 20% on new- 
house  purchases.  The housing-market  frictions imply  (S,s) behavior for 
durable-goods  expenditures.  The combination  of idiosyncratic  risk and 
borrowing  constraints  through  the down-payment  requirements  imply 
that consumers  have a strong precautionary saving motive,  and are will- 
ing to postpone  their purchases  of the durable good in order to save cash 
when  unemployment  risk increases.  Since recessions  are periods  when 
consumers  face high  unemployment  risk, a substantial  fraction of con- 
sumers  respond  to the recession  by delaying  purchases-resulting  in a 
large shift in the lower  trigger of the (S,s) band for durables.  Given this 
structure,  calibrated to match certain features of U.S.  data, the model  is 
solved,  simulated,  and  aggregated  to produce  statistics  from which  to 
run regressions  and match results to aggregate data. 
The intuition  that consumers  may delay  purchases  of durables in re- 
sponse  to  increased  unemployment  risk during  the  recession  is  very 
appealing,  as  is  the  notion  of  (S,s)  bands  responding  because  of  the 
increased  value of liquid assets at the onset of recessions.  Unfortunately, 
1. For example,  the  (S,s) literature on  consumer  durables  often  focuses  on  the degree  of 
"excess  smoothness"  of  durables  expenditures  relative  to  a  benchmark  frictionless 
model.  Such smoothness  is summarized  by the MA coefficient on a univariate durables 
expenditures  equation.  Linking  the  degree  of  smoothness  to the  severity  of financial 
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the sheer size of the model and the complexity  of calibration make many 
statements  beyond  that difficult. In addition,  from a calibration point of 
view, it is very difficult to judge whether  or not the model is a success.2 It 
replicates  some  features  of the  data,  most  notably that unemployment 
expectations  help  forecast consumption  growth  (although  the data sug- 
gest  that the level  should  matter, whereas  the model finds that only the 
growth  rate should  matter), but not others.  Unfortunately,  the authors 
provide  very  little information  regarding  how  well  the model  matches 
basic correlations and autocorrelations  of the key model variables. More 
perplexingly,  the  model  does  not  seem  to be capable of replicating  the 
Campbell-Mankiw  result that forecastable income growth predicts non- 
durables consumption  growth. 
After presenting  model  simulations,  the paper focuses  on an exercise 
intended  to illuminate  the effects  of financial deregulation.  The experi- 
ment  considered  is  an  exogenous  reduction  in  the  down-payment  re- 
quirement  from 20% to 10%. In the new  steady  state that results  from 
this  reduction,  consumer  spending  on  nondurables  and  durables  is 
found  to be more sensitive  to unemployment  risk. The intuition behind 
this  result  is  that  consumers  have  higher  levels  of  debt  and  hence 
greater fixed payments  to consider  when  deciding  if and when  to liqui- 
date financial assets  to buy a new  house.3 It is this increased  sensitivity 
that the authors  use  as an explanation  for the weakness  of the durable 
goods  expenditures  during  the  1990 recession.  Unfortunately,  as  the 
authors mention,  the degree  of increased sensitivity  seems very difficult 
to pin down  and varies across parameter values,  making any statement 
beyond  "it can occur" somewhat  difficult to make with a high degree of 
confidence. 
Besides the difficulty in obtaining precise answers regarding the quan- 
titative effects  of deregulation  as it is currently modeled,  it seems  very 
difficult  to  answer  the  question  qualitatively  without  knowing  more 
about  how  such  deregulation  affects both  the  supply  and  demand  for 
consumer  goods  and the supply  and demand  for debt. In particular, one 
2. Despite the model's complexity,  it omits certain  key features  such as risk  associated  with 
asset values and variations  in interest  rates.  The  former  is especially  important  if one can 
borrow  against the collateral  value of the house. To  the extent that changes in interest 
rates ease debt burdens, the latter  provides a significant  link between monetary  policy 
and consumer  spending. 
3. If the basic driving force behind the increased precautionary  savings is the fact that 
consumers have a substantial  part of their current  income accounted  for through  fixed 
debt payments, one wonders whether there isn't a simpler  model that would capture 
this effect and still provide the link between increased  unemployment  expectations  and 
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would  expect  financial  deregulation  to  have  a  large  impact  on  asset 
values  given  constraints  on  supply  in the short run. To the extent  that 
consumers  can  borrow  against  the  collateral  value  of  their  existing 
homes,  such  a rise in asset  values  could fuel a prolonged  expansion  in 
consumer  credit.  Under  this  scenario,  the extended  runup in debt and 
subsequent  collapse  of  durables  in  the  1990-1991  recession  may  owe 
more  to the dynamics  of the transition to the new  steady  state than to 
any dynamics  that may occur from an economy  starting out in the new 
steady  state. 
More generally, the paper does  not stop to consider exactly what type 
of financial  deregulation  has occurred throughout  the  1980s, and what 
are its broader consequences  and implications  for consumer  spending. 
The fact that debt levels have risen is well documented,  as is the fact that 
debt service burdens  rose steadily. The paper's view  of financial deregu- 
lation  is primarily a relaxation  of down  payment  restrictions  owing  to 
innovations  in the mortgage market. To investigate  how realistic this is, I 
obtained  data  on  loan-to-value  ratios for houses,  new  cars,  and  used 
cars.4 These  are  plotted  in  Figure  1.  As  one  can  see,  there  is  some 
tendency  for car loan-to-value  ratios to rise during  the  1980s but  little 
tendency  for housing  ratios to do so. Thus the notion  that the economy 
has settled  at a new,  higher  level  in terms of mortgage  debt per house- 
hold  seems  far fetched,  as does  the  notion  that the  majority of house 
buyers  face  down-payment  difficulties  (this  seems  especially  true  in 
view  of  current  down-payment  requirements,  which  are only  5%). If 
loan-to-value  ratios did  not  rise on  average,  but financial deregulation 
occurred  in  the  housing  market,  the  effect  of  such  deregulation  may 
have come from new  consumers  previously  shut out of the market. If so, 
this  suggests  a completely  different  type  of experiment  should  be run 
with the model. 
While  one  can  quarrel with  the  specifics  of  the  financial  deregula- 
tion exercise,  this paper does  makes some  steps towards formalizing the 
link between  consumer  durables  and  the  severity  of financial frictions 
through the unwillingness  of consumers  to take on more debt in periods 
of high  income  uncertainty. In this model,  such a link comes  through  a 
down-payment  requirement.  In today's world of readily available credit 
and  5% down  payments,  however,  it  would  seem  that  actual  credit 
constraints  are unlikely  to occur with  great frequency  for most  house- 
holds.  Even  if actual credit constraints  do  not  occur, such  households 
may still face credit frictions through high premiums on borrowing rates. 
To examine  how  high  such  premiums  might  be,  I obtained  data  on 
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interest-rate spreads  for (ordered by degree of collateral) new  cars, used 
cars,  24-month  personal  loans,  and  credit-card  debt.5 These  data  are 
plotted  on an annual basis in Figure 2. The plot reveals that the absolute 
levels  of  these  rate  spreads  are high.  For example,  the  7.5% average 
spread of a used-car loan represents  a 30% premium  on the user cost of 
5. The data were again obtained from various issues of the Federal  Reserve  Bulletin.  The 
interest rate spreads  were calculated  by taking  the difference  betweent the actual  inter- 
est rate  and an appropriately  matched  safe T-bill  or government  bond rate. To  decide on 
the relevant maturity  for new and used car loans I used the average  maturity  numbers 
reported  in the Bulletin. 
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capital for old cars.6 For credit-card loans,  the premiums  over safe rates 
average  14%.  In  addition  to  being  high  on  average,  consumer  rate 
spreads  clearly  vary  inversely  with  the  degree  of  collateral (new  cars 
have  the  lowest  spread,  credit-card debt  the  highest)  and  tend  to in- 
crease during business-cycle  downturns.  In addition,  rate spreads have 
steadily  risen in most  categories  throughout  the 1980s, as indebtedness 
has increased. 
These  facts again suggest  a slightly  different view  of credit liberaliza- 
tion, namely, that while more consumers  obtain access to credit, they are 
paying a large premium to do so. More generally, such facts suggest  that 
premia on external funds  may be an important component  of consumer 
decision  making.  Obtaining  a better  understanding  of how  important 
such  premia  are for the  dynamics  of  consumer  durables  seems  like  a 
logical  next  step  in what  appears  to be a rapidly evolving  literature on 
consumer  behavior. 
Discussion 
Chris Carroll began  by commenting  on a few  points  made  by the  dis- 
cussants.  In defense  of the neglect  of housing-price  risk in their paper, 
Carroll cited  work  by Mark Frantantoni on  the  effect  of housing-price 
risk on agents'  decisions  to hold risky assets.  Frantantoni's paper found 
that  one  can  separate  the  financial  risks  of  homeownership  into  two 
parts: the risk associated  with variations in the house  price and the risk 
created by  the  fixed  obligation  of monthly  mortgage  payments,  which 
reduces  the homeowner's  ability to smooth consumption  and effectively 
increases  risk aversion.  Fratantoni found  the latter effect to be the more 
important,  justifying  Carroll and Dunn's  emphasis  on that channel. 
In response  to  comments  that  their paper  focused  too  narrowly  on 
housing  purchases  and  financing,  Carroll argued  that housing-related 
assets  and liabilities dominate  consumer  balance sheets,  the analysis  of 
which  had  been  their original  objective.  Janice Eberly responded  that, 
while  she  found  the effects  of quasifixed  housing  expenditures  on con- 
sumer spending  and saving behavior very interesting,  she was not con- 
vinced  that reliance solely  on housing  data was the best way to calibrate 
these  effects.  She noted  that households  have a variety of mechanisms 
6. While  it is  difficult  to sort out  how  much  of the  spread  over  the  safe rate represents 
compensation  for average default risk, the potential distortions created by such spreads 
appear  to be  large.  For example,  even  on  comparing  the average  spread  for used-car 
loans with that for new-car loans (4.6%), one still obtains a 20% premium in the user cost 
of used  vs.  new  cars. 
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for  managing  their  home  payments,  such  as  varying  the  size  of  the 
house  purchased  or the structure of the mortgage terms. She suggested 
that it would  be simpler  to look directly at households'  total fixed pay- 
ments,  which  could  be modeled  as costly  to adjust.  Carroll noted  that 
they  had  taken  this  approach  to  some  extent  in  the  first part of  their 
paper in their analysis of the debt service burden, but they had found no 
evidence  that the level of debt service per se was an important determi- 
nant of consumption. 
Greg Mankiw noted  that although  he liked buffer-stock models,  work 
by John Shea has led him to have some nagging  doubts.  Shea's research 
explores  the  prediction  that  households  facing  liquidity  constraints 
should  respond  asymmetrically  to  expected  changes  in  income.  Shea 
found  the asymmetry  to be the opposite  of that predicted by the theory: 
Specifically, he  found  that consumption  does  not  respond  to expected 
increases  in income  but does  respond  to expected  income declines.  Car- 
roll contended  that Shea's  results  are generally  not very robust,  a view 
that was  seconded  by Angus  Deaton. 
Anil Kashyap  observed  that there do exist companies  that are willing 
to insure  consumer  mortgage  payments  against  the risk of unemploy- 
ment.  He conjectured  that two factors may lead to a lack of demand  for 
this insurance-it  may not be priced actuarially fairly, or consumers  may 
already mitigate the unemployment  risk by other means,  such as precau- 
tionary saving  or choosing  a smaller house.  Kashyap suggested  that the 
paper  needs  to explain  why  people  do  not  generally  take this  type  of 
insurance.  Carroll  offered  the  possibility  that  this  type  of  insurance 
might be relatively new and hence unfamiliar to consumers.  In any case, 
he argued,  in practice it seems  difficult to discount  the effects of unem- 
ployment  risk, as the data suggest  that unemployment  expectations  are 
very  important  for determining  home  sales  and  purchases  of  durable 
goods.  Carroll conceded  that their model  does  not fully explain the lack 
of  risk sharing  but  emphasized  that its ability to rationalize  a role for 
unemployment  expectations  in the  house  purchase  decision,  indepen- 
dent of the expected  level of income,  is a desirable feature. 
Robert Hall again  raised  the  issue  of house  price risk; he  wondered 
why  this  risk was  particularly pertinent  to  current consumption  deci- 
sions,  given  that the flow of housing  services is unchanged,  and holding 
constant  current and  expected  future  income.  Deaton  replied  that the 
issue  is that the equity will not be there if needed  (i.e.,  if there is a bad 
income  draw);  indeed,  one  cannot  sell  the  house  and  get  out  of  the 
leveraged  position  at all if the home's  value declines by enough. 
Julio Rotemberg  noted  that legal changes  have made it easier to seek 
refuge  in bankruptcy  now  than in the past,  and that perhaps  this is a Discussion 229 
reason  people  are taking on more debt. He suggested  that more lenient 
bankruptcy laws could be thought  of as increased insurance against poor 
income  draws; and if so,  these  changes  arguably would  increase rather 
than decrease  the empirical relevance  of the permanent-income  model. 
Carroll expressed  skepticism of the view that people think of bankruptcy 
as a contingency  plan,  and  so he  did not  agree that the legal  changes 
were likely to be important factors. 